Kosovo, the youngest country in Europe, is considered corrupt and politically fragile; the economic situation is very poor, unemployment is high, the people feel frustrated, and the question of status remains a key issue. Andreras Ernst, a journalist and expert on the Balkans, blames the political elite in this small country, as well as Western countries, for these problems. […]
“Kosovo cannot progress with this political elite”

Kosovo, the youngest country in Europe, is considered corrupt and politically fragile; the economic situation is very poor, unemployment is high, the people feel frustrated, and the question of status remains a key issue. Andreras Ernst, a journalist and expert on the Balkans, blames the political elite in this small country, as well as Western countries, for these problems.
He gave an interview to Swissinfo.ch, in which he speaks about Kosovo, reports Klan Kosova.
Ten years ago, the Republic of Kosovo declared independence from Serbia. Is there reason to celebrate the anniversary now?
Andreas Ernst: Of course, there is nothing wrong with celebrating this historic moment. But these celebrations should serve as an opportunity to look critically at recent years. Not only the ten years of independence, but also the 19 years since the end of the war. And not only Kosovars, but also the Western powers, which played a decisive role in bringing about this situation, should use this opportunity to take a self-critical stance.
Switzerland was one of the first countries to recognize the new state. Was this early recognition – in retrospect – right or wrong?
Andreas Ernst: The timing is not that important. The fact that Switzerland recognized Kosovo so early was the result of an agreement with the US, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy. As a respected member of the international community, which could not be accused of behaving like a superpower, it had to recognize Kosovo as soon as possible as an act of “breaking the ice.” This would make it easier for other countries to recognize this new Balkan state.
In other words, this was done to give it legitimacy and soften the impression – quite rightly, in fact – that the state of Kosovo was the product of the policies of the great powers. It should be added here that Micheline Calmy-Rey, the foreign minister at the time, had a particular desire to support it, but not as a sensationalist gesture.
One of the main destinations for the Kosovo diaspora is Switzerland, with around 180,000 Kosovars. Is there a “Swiss presence” that can be seen and felt in Kosovo?
Andreas Ernst: Yes, clearly. First of all, the diaspora, not only from Switzerland, contributes 15 percent to Kosovo’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which of course implies many personal connections. For example, Foreign Minister and billionaire Behgjet Pacolli holds both Swiss and Kosovar citizenship, as does Interior Minister Flamur Sefaj. Both acquired citizenship in Ticino.
You can also see references to Switzerland in everyday life in Kosovo: for example, the Swiss Diamond hotel in Pristina. And with a little luck, you can get things done in Pristina by speaking Swiss German.
Kosovo does not fare well internationally because of its reputation. There is talk of nepotism, a lack of foreign investment, insecurity, political pensions… Why can’t the country move forward?
Andreas Ernst: There are two reasons for this. First, the organization of the state remains incomplete. Its institutions are in the hands of a political elite inclined to enrich itself and its followers. The parties belong to a truly clientelist system, where loyalty translates into jobs and positions.
Second, after the war, the international protectors quickly reached agreements with the political elite because they thought those people could guarantee stability and, conversely, threaten instability. And because the protectors valued stability more than the rule of law and democracy, this political elite was able to grow stronger.
Of course, this also applies to the entire Balkans, where the West puts stability first, followed by democracy and the rule of law.
With President Hashim Thaçi and Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj, power remains in the hands of former members of the KLA. What does this mean for Kosovo?
Andreas Ernst: It is precisely this continuity of “strongmen,” with a few interruptions since the postwar period, that determines the country’s path. They are part of a system that I would describe as part of the problem. I cannot imagine Kosovo making progress with this political elite.
Relations with neighboring Serbia, which considers Kosovo its territory, are tense. Added to this is the killing of Serbian politician Oliver Ivanovic in January this year, in the ethnically divided city of Mitrovica. In this ongoing situation, is the situation on the verge of an explosion?
Andreas Ernst: The current situation between Kosovo and Serbia is relaxed. From time to time there are provocations, but in fact all the parties – politicians, the media and the people themselves – know that these tensions are escalating. I recall the case of a train that was said to be making a trip in January 2017 from Serbia to Mitrovica, bearing the words: “Kosovo is Serbia”
The killing of Oliver Ivanovic had no impact on interethnic relations. Because in Mitrovica, where I have often been, all my interlocutors said that it was an internal Serbian problem. Most citizens in northern Kosovo do not believe Ivanovic’s killing had anything to do with interethnic tensions, but that it is connected to the mafia and those aligned with Belgrade.
How is the economy between the two states doing?
Andreas Ernst: Kosovo imports many products from Serbia. The new state has a large trade deficit because almost nothing is produced there, which means that little is exported. Relations between the two Chambers of Commerce are very good. Trade fairs are held in Pristina and Belgrade, and the presidents of both chambers maintain friendly relations. All relations that are not linked to political developments and scenarios are, at least for the moment, free of pressure.
Nevertheless, there is still a risk in Kosovo that political crises, which are not necessarily linked to interethnic relations, could eventually lead to violence. The domestic political situation in Kosovo is extremely tense, and the people are frustrated. This is most evident among young people, who do not like their neighbors and cannot move around freely. When the difficult economic situation and the country’s uncertain prospects are added to this, an even greater burden falls on citizens.
In 2013, under pressure from the EU, Serbia and Kosovo signed the standardization agreement. What has it contributed?
The essential part of this standardization agreement contains the idea that Serbia should withdraw from northern Kosovo and that this area should be pushed toward integration into the state of Kosovo. In return, Kosovo Serbs would gain the right to establish an association.
Today, at least on paper, northern Kosovo is part of Kosovo: justice is administered under Kosovo law, the police officers are Kosovar, and everything seems to be functioning.
However, Pristina is reluctant to establish an association of Serb municipalities, for fear that it would become a Trojan horse for Belgrade and institutionalize its influence.
Could Kosovo’s admission to the EU become a reality in the coming years?
Andreas Ernst: Of course, there will be no immediate admission. There are five EU countries that have not yet recognized Kosovo. Therefore, the EU would not be able to force Serbia to recognize it. Perhaps these five states – Spain, Romania, Greece, Cyprus and Slovakia – will not take steps toward this until Serbia does so.
Brussels has made it clear that if Serbia wants to join the EU, it would have to conclude a treaty under international law with Kosovo. Belgrade must commit not to obstruct Kosovo’s entry into international organizations such as the United Nations.
But Kosovo’s admission to the EU in the coming years is not a realistic option, because the country needs to undertake deep institutional and economic reforms. I do not believe that the current political elite is capable of or willing to undertake such fundamental reforms. It would mean the end of its existence as a political and economic class.


















