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What the U.S. Election Results Mean for Trump’s War with Iran

What the U.S. Election Results Mean for Trump’s War with Iran

U.S. President Donald Trump spent the final weeks of the midterm election campaign in the United States predicting that the war with Iran would end “immediately after the election.” The votes have now been counted, and his Republican Party is facing losses in both chambers of Congress, losses that the U.S. vice president attributed […]

U.S. President Donald Trump spent the final weeks of the midterm election campaign in the United States predicting that the war with Iran would end “immediately after the election.”

The votes have now been counted, and his Republican Party is facing losses in both chambers of Congress, losses that the U.S. vice president attributed to the conflict.

“The reason we lost was the war,” Vice President JD Vance said in a post on X on November 4. Trump said that assessment was “largely true,” but added that he would make the same decision again because “Iran cannot be allowed to have nuclear weapons.”

This leaves Trump – almost two months before the Democrat-led Congress takes control of the budget and the chairmanships of committees that subpoena witnesses – facing less favorable options: negotiate, escalate, or take no action.

“Democrats don’t take control today,” Shayan Samii, a U.S.-based national security expert, told Radio Farda of Radio Free Europe. “Trump still has two months to act, without being affected by the implications of the election result, if he wants to resume the military campaign.”

A president can justify military intervention by invoking national security concerns, Samii said. Any bill seeking to limit the war would require Trump’s signature or a two-thirds majority in both chambers of Congress, the House of Representatives and the Senate, to override his veto.

“Some experts believe that Democrats can change the course of the military confrontation with the Islamic Republic. I don’t see it that way,” he said.

Scenario 1: A full-scale resumption of the war

President Trump has repeatedly hinted that he could resume large-scale attacks after the election, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reportedly been pressuring him to do so.

A renewed military campaign would likely follow the pattern of April, when U.S. and Israeli strikes targeted bridges, railway lines, and energy infrastructure, as Trump threatened to set “every power plant in Iran” on fire.

On Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil export terminal, only military facilities have been hit so far. Striking the island’s energy infrastructure is a step Washington has not yet taken and has not needed to take, as the blockade of Iranian ports has brought Iranian oil exports to almost zero.

Shahin Modarres, a Rome-based Iranian security expert, expects this line to be crossed as well.

“Unfortunately, I see a fierce war ahead of us,” he told Radio Farda.

He explained that Washington has acted in several stages: first through deterrence and, after a memorandum of understanding failed in June – which he described as quite favorable to Tehran – through an economic campaign involving harsh sanctions, flight restrictions, and partial closures of Iran’s land borders. Since this pressure has not produced results, the next stage, he said, is to force Tehran to capitulate.

At this stage, Modarres said, “the country’s infrastructure, the energy sector, and the economic sectors” would all be targets, along with what remains of Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, “especially Pickaxe Mountain” – a fortified underground complex near Natanz that Trump has threatened since July to attack.

The aim would be to drive the country toward collapse until the Islamic Republic surrenders, allowing “a layer of this regime” – elements of the current leadership – to take control, “at least for a while.” Such a surrender, Modarres added, would significantly increase the likelihood that the system would collapse entirely.

But in recent weeks, Tehran has warned of the consequences of a new conflict.

On October 31, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei ordered commanders to prepare for an “immediate, impactful response with no geographical limits” to any new attack, and to expand the list of targets.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has also threatened to target undersea communications cables in the Persian Gulf, while warning that U.S. bases outside the Middle East and energy infrastructure in the region would also be targeted.

Iran has hinted that, unlike the 40-day war, during which Tehran expanded the conflict regionally, even more countries would be drawn into the next conflict. A resumption of fighting would also cause fuel prices to rise even further.

Scenario 2: A major strike, followed by withdrawal

Although unlikely, a middle path could appeal to a president who wants to achieve a victory without committing to a long war.

Reports in late October claimed that the Trump administration had warned its regional allies that a short, intense military operation against Iran was possible after the election.

One of the main targets could be Pickaxe Mountain. President Trump could then declare that Iran’s nuclear program had been damaged sufficiently and seek to reach an agreement providing for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for easing some sanctions and postponing nuclear program talks.

Parts of the facility are believed to lie 80 to 100 meters underground, making it difficult to verify any claims that it has been destroyed. Iran’s military command, the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, has warned that bombing the mountain would amount to a resumption of war across the region.

Therefore, while the United States may hope to carry out a short military campaign, Iran could drag out the war in the hope of increasing the political and financial costs for Trump.

Scenario 3: No war, no peace

Trump could also simply continue with his current position, carrying out “defensive” strikes, maintaining the naval blockade, and continuing to have the U.S. Navy escort commercial ships through the Strait of Hormuz.

However, the status quo is unsustainable, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said in late October that the country must move beyond the situation of “neither war nor peace.”

Samii also said he doubted that partial measures, such as occasional strikes on military facilities on Iranian islands, could continue for a long time.

By mid-2027, he said, Washington’s attention would turn to the 2028 presidential race, and candidates from both parties would seek a long-term solution for Iran rather than inherit this problem.

Scenario 4: A temporary agreement

Diplomatically, a limited agreement mediated by Qatar could be reached, similar to the memorandum of understanding signed in June, which briefly halted the fighting and lifted the blockade, but later unraveled.

Markets appear to be pricing in such an agreement. On November 4, the price of Brent crude fell below $100 per barrel.

Iran has offered to reopen the Strait of Hormuz within two days if Washington meets its seven conditions, including lifting the naval blockade, easing sanctions, guaranteeing an end to attacks, and a regional ceasefire that includes Lebanon.

A broader agreement that would include Iran’s nuclear program appears less likely. Washington is seeking a commitment that it could verify, ensuring that Iran would not rebuild its program, while Tehran says nuclear talks can begin only after its conditions are met.

Modarres argued that diplomacy and escalating the conflict are not mutually exclusive.

He said that both Vance and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio are likely to be potential candidates in the 2028 presidential election and, in his view, each wants to take credit for any success and blame the other for any failure. But essentially, they are playing the roles of “good cop and bad cop,” keeping “a door half open” until the last moment, “even after the war begins,” so that Tehran still has a chance to surrender.

Factors that could derail the scenarios

Several factors could derail any of these scenarios.

Israel could act alone if it believes Washington is moving toward an agreement it opposes.

Inside Iran, the failure of the June memorandum of understanding was partly attributed to hard-line factions that were directing attacks on commercial ships. This shows that an agreement can be sabotaged just as easily by Tehran as by Washington.

Meanwhile, Tehran is already interpreting the U.S. midterm election results as confirmation of its position. Before the vote, analysts argued that Iran believed it was winning the war. A decisive Democratic victory could encourage it to raise its demands and wait until the president, already weakened and with less room to maneuver, faces even greater difficulties.

And then there is Trump himself.

Asked on November 4 when the war with Iran would end, he gave the same answer as on October 27: “Whenever I want”./RFE

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