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“Germany Is at Risk of Collapsing”

“Germany Is at Risk of Collapsing”

A conversation with George Friedman, founder and CEO of Geopolitical Futures. Teutons make up the largest ethnic group in the United States. Why has Washington never been pro-German? Like other immigrants who have come to the United States over the centuries, Germans came to the New World with the aim of severing […]

A conversation with George Friedman, founder and CEO of Geopolitical Futures.

Teutons make up the largest ethnic group in the United States. Why has Washington never been pro-German?

Like other immigrants who have come to the United States over the centuries, Germans came to the New World with the aim of severing every tie with their homeland, putting the past behind them once and for all. In many cases, they were fleeing their country of origin. The separation, whether chosen or forced, prevented them from acting in favor of Germany and other Germanic states of origin (Austria, Switzerland, Prussia, Bavaria). Moreover, rather than forming a monolith, German Americans differed greatly from one another in language, religious belief, and social background. In fact, it was impossible for Bavarians, Saxons, Thuringians, Prussians, Catholics, Lutherans, conservatives, and socialists to come together as a single body capable of influencing United States foreign policy. On the contrary, assimilation and becoming an integral part of the American people were inevitable. Exactly what happened.

And yet for a long time there was a fear that Germans would remain outsiders in American society. When did assimilation finally take place?

The turning points were the two world wars. Sent to the front to fight first the Axis powers and then the Third Reich, German Americans suddenly realized that they were no longer German. At that point they chose America, rejecting their homeland of origin. So much so that in both the First and Second World Wars, commanders of German origin, such as John Pershing, Chester Nimitz, Carl Spaatz, and future President Dwight Eisenhower, were placed at the head of American troops. It was a choice that engaged and made the Deutschamerikaner responsible. Why not also a tangible demonstration of how history itself was accelerating a process already under way.

Beyond geography, what has been the main German contribution to American culture?

The awareness that it was necessary to establish a high-level governing class, made up of public servants. Bureaucracy in the highest sense of the term, a category then unknown in the United States. A concept initially developed by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, spread to the New World by German immigrants and embraced by Americans as something that worked with the federal machinery. On an even more philosophical level, in the 1960s it was the so-called Frankfurt School that fostered the American left of the progressive variety, which moved to center stage during the protests against the war in Vietnam. A left that was clearly more radical than its native counterpart. For this purpose, the work of Herbert Marcuse was essential. A Berlin-born philosopher who emigrated to the United States in the 1930s and became very well known during his time teaching at Harvard.

Henry Kissinger is undoubtedly among the most influential Germans in America. What is your opinion of him?

Kissinger was an extraordinary tactician. The opening to the People’s Republic of China and the maneuver by which he managed to wrest Egypt from the Soviet camp will certainly go down in history. But he was not a great strategist, since he underestimated the military instrument. For Kissinger, diplomacy and negotiation were almost everything. An approach that proved effective at the time, because after the defeat in Vietnam, America was seen as being on the defensive. But a great power must know how to go on the offensive and wage war if necessary. It is not enough to understand the dynamics of international relations if you are not prepared to shake them up. Kissinger was committed to preserving power rather than increasing it. For this reason, he secured only tactical successes and did not bring about the fall of the Soviet Union.

Throughout history, the United States has very often opposed Germany’s geopolitical ambitions militarily. What makes Berlin so dangerous?

The sole fact that Germany has considerable power in the wrong place. The problem is not Berlin so much as Washington’s inevitable need to prevent any power from dominating the Eurasian continent, since that would threaten its control of the sea lanes, the basis of global dominance. Over the decades, geography, demographics, and technology have enabled Berlin to assume the role of potential European hegemon, thereby provoking Washington’s predictable response. But the result was the same when the Soviet Union, rather than Germany, was in that position. America has neither a special interest in nor any particular animus toward Germany; it is simply firmly implementing its strategic premises and will do the same in the future.

Is this an objective pursued systematically by both the political class and the federal agencies ?

Strategic imperatives impose themselves spontaneously on politicians and institutions, simply through inertia. Placed in a given context, human beings act as best they can to protect themselves. The same applies to nation-states. This explains why politicians are so often forced to discard promises made during election campaigns, or why bureaucrats are considered merciless calculators. As we know well, “the Owl of Minerva” takes flight at dusk. What happens is often only understandable ex post.

Why did the United States favor German reunification at the end of the Cold War?

For two simple reasons. The Bush administration was aware that reunification was inevitable and that any American attempt to prevent it would prove futile, if not counterproductive. In short, it would not have been wise to oppose the tide of history. In addition, federal agencies thought that a united Germany would be more useful to the superpower’s interests, since it would obstruct the expansionist aims of Russia, France, or the United Kingdom (which, not coincidentally, opposed the merger of Bonn and Berlin). Once again, rather than reasoning in relation to individual countries, the United States applied in the European context the strategy it adopts in every major theater: seeking an actual balance of power. The classic approach of the United Kingdom, readapted to American needs and also used against London itself.

What kind of moment is Germany experiencing today?

A very critical moment. In recent years, Berlin has established extraordinary economic relations and equally extraordinary political resistance. The elites of foreign countries benefit from the exchanges they conduct with Germany, while the lower-middle classes have been harmed. This is where protectionist and anti-German movements have emerged, promoted at the national level by new figures or instrumentalized by minor representatives of the ruling class. But Berlin does not seem capable of overcoming this impasse, of turning its economic strength into geopolitical returns. On the contrary, it views these phenomena with suspicion. It considers maintaining trade exchanges sufficient: it is unaware of its own size. Such a mismatch risks determining its fate.

Why does Germany not know how to transform itself into an empire that redistributes wealth and creates dependencies between itself and the members of the system?

For the same reason that no European country is able to assimilate immigrants. In Germany, as in the rest of the continent, the nation is inextricably linked to the history, culture, and language of a particular people. It is not an idea that a foreigner can also embrace; practical citizenship cannot be granted to just anyone. No European country sees itself as having a universal function, with the task of regulating the system. Moreover, Germany is an enormously fragile country, since it exports almost 50% of its GDP without controlling the sea lanes and has no topographical barriers, except on its southern front. Such weakness has convinced Germans of the need to focus solely on survival in the narrowest sense, without thinking about anything else. In doing so, they set in motion a perverse mechanism that often leads Berlin to make life even more difficult for itself.

The impression is that, faced with the choice between becoming an empire and reverting to a conventional country, Germany has chosen to formalize its sphere of influence in the heart of the continent. Is that what is happening?

Dependent on exports and seeking to prevent industrial hubs from emerging in neighboring countries, Berlin’s objective is to preserve the European trading area in its entirety, possibly by equipping it with its own currency. Political integration—a European idea—is of secondary, if not marginal, importance. For this reason, the Federal Republic does not genuinely seek to push Greece or Italy out of the euro; for the same reason, it is concerned by the United Kingdom’s departure from the common market. In the near future, Germany would accept a reduction in the common trading area only if forced to do so or as a result of other member states leaving. In that case, it would retreat into its sphere of influence. A real possibility—albeit one driven by the will of others—since the European Union is on the verge of collapse. It is impossible to imagine that area of free trade, intertwined with German interests, remaining in this form for long.

Would the United States consider a German sphere centered on Mitteleuropa, including parts of Scandinavia, dangerous?

A great deal would depend on Germany’s ability to go beyond its own limits and build a corresponding geopolitical entity around its economic power. If this were to happen, faced with the prospect of a semi-hegemon established on the European continent, the United States would, as always, react to overturn the situation. But for now there are no signs of this. To survive, Berlin needs more than a Europe in decline, let alone a region with a smaller area and population. Nor is there any sign of German resolve to build a complete nation, capable of pursuing its own interests in every dimension of power.

Nevertheless, bilateral relations have been quite strained for years.

Relations are complicated by Washington’s desire to reduce its trade deficit and compel Berlin to invest more in its own security. In the future, the clash could intensify, but for now these are not decisive issues. Beyond a few impromptu statements by some German politicians, Germany is still opposed to arming itself with military capabilities and has so far been reluctant to increase its defense spending significantly.

Should we expect an increase or a reduction in the American military presence on the continent?

The United States would like to reduce its direct commitment, both in terms of installations and personnel, and “tender” the task of deterring Russia to the countries of Eastern Europe, above all Poland and Romania. Reserving the right to intervene only in the event of open war. In addition, it hopes for greater involvement by NATO member states in the wars in the Middle East, starting with the one against the Islamic State. We can describe the current phase with a paradox: the Americans would like Europeans finally to take part in the Atlantic Alliance. But it is precisely the member states that loudly demand that our presence on the continent be maintained, if not even increased. Not only the governments that have recently taken office, but even Berlin, despite every shade of sovereigntism.

Is a convergence of interests between Germany and Russia possible at this stage—in other words, the classic anathema of American strategy?

It is certainly a possible scenario, but not a probable one. Today Moscow and Berlin do not seem genuinely compatible. Germany needs a subject capable of defending it, but Russia is a country in great economic and geopolitical difficulty, striving to appear more powerful than it is. Three years ago it lost Ukraine and failed either to secure it in any way or to incite a real rebellion in the country’s eastern region. Kyiv, in fact, has continued to move closer to the West, unconcerned by the Kremlin’s threats. Conversely, Moscow is in great need of liquidity, but German finance and industry do not trust investing in the country, owing to endemic domestic instability and the lack of an effective rule of law to safeguard their capital. Unlike a few decades ago, I cannot imagine a scenario in which Germany and Russia act in unison. Especially at the expense of the United States.

How will the clash between Germany and the United States evolve?

A great deal will depend on Berlin’s attitude. In the coming years, the German economy will face very difficult times. Beginning in 2008, Germany managed to avoid the European Union’s economic downturn thanks to increased exports to China and the United States, but the People’s Republic of China has been shaken by an acute structural crisis, and within a few years America will experience a cyclical recession. The simultaneous decline in the two countries’ purchasing power will hit the German economy hard, with unpredictable and potentially dramatic effects on the European continent. Rather than thinking about its own sphere of influence, Berlin will be forced to focus on the survival of its development model. At that point, the United States may abandon its offensive. Because its opponent has fallen. (Bota.al)

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