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The Ohrid Agreement: Normalization Without Recognition and an Endless Dialogue

The Ohrid Agreement: Normalization Without Recognition and an Endless Dialogue

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On the eve of the third anniversary of the Brussels Basic Agreement (27 February 2023) and the Ohrid Annex (18 March 2023), the record remains far from the expectations of the Franco-German initiative. Presented as a historic turning point in Kosovo–Serbia relations, this framework has not produced sustainable normalization, undisputed de facto recognition by Serbia, or significant progress for Kosovo in international integration.

Kosovo continues to face a diplomatic paradox: its application for EU membership, submitted in December 2022, has still not advanced to candidate status. Five member states — Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Cyprus — do not recognize its independence, while membership in the Council of Europe remains incomplete.

European envoy Peter Sørensen’s statement that there is no deadline for concluding the dialogue highlights the absence of a clear outlook for the process launched in 2011. The dialogue thus risks turning from an instrument for resolving the conflict into a mechanism for managing it.

From the German-German Treaty to the reality of the Ohrid Agreement

The 2022 Franco-German diplomatic initiative, supported by the United States and the European Union, was inspired by the 1972 Basic Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. It was presented as an opportunity for a historic turning point (Zeitenwende) in Kosovo–Serbia relations, seeking normalization through a form of indirect recognition without requiring Belgrade to formally recognize Kosovo’s independence. However, comparing the two cases reveals fundamental differences: the German-German Treaty rested on the political will to normalize relations and on a defined institutional framework, whereas the Brussels Agreement and the Ohrid Annex remained unsigned and were only partially implemented. Serbia continued to treat the agreement as a political commitment that did not imply recognition of Kosovo.

An even more important difference concerns the historical purpose of the Basic Treaty. For the Federal Republic of Germany, normalizing relations with East Germany did not mean abandoning the prospect of national reunification, but creating the conditions for peace, cooperation, and the possibility for the German people to achieve their unity one day through free self-determination. This was expressed in the Letter on German Unity (Brief zur deutschen Einheit), submitted in connection with the signing of the Basic Treaty in December 1972. The document emphasized that the agreement did not conflict with the Federal Republic’s political objective of a peaceful European order in which the German people would be able to regain their unity freely.

It was precisely this element of the German model that Belgrade sought to adapt to its own interests through the letter of former Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, submitted in Brussels in December 2023. Through it, Serbia declared that the Basic Agreement and the Ohrid Annex were acceptable only insofar as they did not imply de facto or de jure recognition of Kosovo, respect for its territorial integrity, or acceptance of its membership in the United Nations and other international organizations. Thus, Belgrade sought a kind of “German equivalent” through which it could keep its territorial claim to Kosovo open while benefiting from the provisions of the agreement it considered favorable.

Nevertheless, the analogy between the two letters is fundamentally problematic. The West German letter rested on the prospect of peaceful reunification and the free self-determination of the Germans; the Serbian letter sought to preserve the contestation of Kosovo’s sovereignty, whose independence was declared in 2008 and whose declaration of independence, according to the International Court of Justice’s 2010 advisory opinion, had not violated international law. A formula designed to facilitate the peaceful coexistence of the two German states cannot be mechanically transplanted into a context in which one party continues to contest the other’s very existence as a state.

Equally significant was the way Brnabić’s letter was handled by international mediators. It was not accompanied by a clear public objection from the EU and the US that would rule out its use to relativize Serbia’s obligations. Although there were later contradictory statements about the letter’s status and possible withdrawal, the lack of a documented clarification left room for uncertainty. This does not prove that Brussels or Washington approved its contents, but it raises questions about the consistency of Western mediation.

In this context, the weakness of the Ohrid Agreement lies not only in the absence of signatures, but in the lack of mutual political will, credible implementation mechanisms, and a final institutional objective. Unlike the 1972 Basic Treaty, which created a functional framework for inter-German relations and paved the way for both states to join the UN in 1973, the Brussels–Ohrid framework created an asymmetric dynamic: Kosovo was required to undertake concrete institutional obligations, while Serbia retained political ambiguity and continued to oppose Kosovo’s international integration.

In April 2023, German analyst Bodo Weber interpreted the agreement with cautious optimism. Commenting on the advancement of Kosovo’s application to the Council of Europe, he assessed that this development constituted the first step in implementing the European proposal. Weber recalled that several Western countries, including Germany, had previously blocked Kosovo’s progress in this organization, linking the lifting of the blockage to acceptance of the agreement. According to him, membership in the Council of Europe would also open the way for Kosovo’s participation in other international organizations — an expectation based on Article 4 of the Basic Agreement, under which Serbia should not oppose Kosovo’s membership in international organizations.

Subsequent developments called this optimism into question. Although the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recommended Kosovo’s membership in April 2024, the Committee of Ministers did not make the final decision. The process was tied to further political demands, especially the establishment of the Association of Serb-majority municipalities. This exposed the gap between normalization commitments and concrete results.

The Council of Europe: Diplomatic conditionality or political calculation?

The case of the Council of Europe illustrates the limits of the Ohrid Agreement. Several supporting countries publicly justified postponing the decision by the need for concrete steps toward the Association. This created the impression of asymmetric conditionality, without comparable consequences for the obstacles Serbia places in the way of Kosovo’s international subjectivity.

One may ask whether other concerns also influenced this decision, including the possible legal consequences of membership in the Council of Europe. But the link between the postponement and proceedings in the Specialist Chambers remains an undocumented hypothesis; membership would not automatically guarantee access to the European Court of Human Rights in relation to earlier matters.

Without documentary evidence, it cannot be asserted that European governments sought to avoid a judicial scenario or acted in coordination with Belgrade or Moscow. Nevertheless, the reasoning behind decisions on Kosovo’s membership requires transparency.

Lessons from the Specialist Court on imposed compromises

Another dimension affecting Kosovo’s international position relates to the political consequences of the 16 September 2026 judgment in the Specialist Chambers. In this context, a particular concern is the risk that the interpretation of the judgment, especially the use of the concept of a joint criminal enterprise, may be exploited to historically delegitimize the KLA and, indirectly, to contest the legitimacy of Kosovo’s statehood. This situation also raises the need for a serious legal and institutional debate on the powers of the Specialist Chambers and the possibility of reviewing their legal framework by the Kosovo Assembly, while respecting judicial independence and constitutional and international obligations.

The establishment of the Specialist Court in 2015 illustrates the weight of diplomatic pressure on the decision-making of a small state. Kosovo accepted an institution with extraordinary powers, among other things in the expectation that cooperation would help address the allegations in Dick Marty’s report and strengthen its international position. This experience raises the question of how political commitments accompanying institutional compromises should be assessed. At the same time, the distinction between individual criminal responsibility and the liberating character of the war must be preserved.

One of the most problematic provisions of the Brussels Basic Agreement remains Article 7, which provides for an appropriate level of self-management for the Serb community in Kosovo, without clearly defining the legal and institutional boundaries of this concept. The ambiguity is not merely terminological: self-management can be understood as inter-municipal cooperation, but can also be interpreted as pointing toward functional autonomy. The EU draft statute of 11 October 2023 makes this dilemma concrete. Article 2 refers to certain executive powers; Articles 13–16 provide for functions in education and healthcare, including the management of institutions funded by Serbia; while Article 25 gives the Association’s Assembly the power to adopt internal acts and set priorities. Although the draft provides for constitutional review and respect for the powers of Kosovo’s authorities, the combination of these functions raises the question of whether, in practice, a new decision-making center could be created that affects the functionality of the state.

A particular concern arises from Article 42 of the draft statute, which provides for arbitration of disputes between the Association and Kosovo’s central authorities concerning the implementation or interpretation of the statute, if they are not resolved through negotiations or other means. Each party appoints an arbitrator and the parties seek to agree on a chair; if they fail to do so within the specified timeframe, the chair may be appointed by the European Union at the request of either party. The commission decides by a two-thirds majority, and its decision is described as final and binding. This provision does not turn the Association into a sovereign entity, and arbitration is not in itself unconstitutional. Nevertheless, for a unitary state it raises a fundamental question: how is binding decision-making by an arbitral body, in whose composition the EU may intervene, compatible with the jurisdiction of the courts and the ultimate authority of Kosovo’s Constitution? Without clearly defining the scope of arbitration, its relationship with domestic courts, and constitutional review, there is a risk of recurring institutional disputes. Of course, European representatives may accompany the approval of such a draft with conciliatory rhetoric and promises of political benefits. However, the experience of adopting the Law on the Specialist Chambers shows that this initially understanding approach may give way to increasing political pressure, confronting Kosovo with fait accompli arrangements that have long-term consequences for its sovereignty and state functionality. Therefore, any political naivety or unconditional acceptance of new institutional arrangements could come at a high cost, the consequences of which would be much more difficult to correct in the future.

Equally sensitive is the other part of Article 7, which provides for the formal recognition of the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church and a high level of protection for its religious and cultural heritage. The Ahtisaari Plan, the Constitution, and the relevant legislation already provide broad guarantees for the Serb community and Orthodox religious sites. Therefore, any new arrangement must explain what specific legal gap it seeks to fill and whether it alters the existing constitutional balance. The draft statute of the Association does not regulate this ecclesiastical status in detail; the direct source of the debate here is Article 7 of the Basic Agreement itself. In this context, the possibility that Belgrade may use the protracted dialogue to gradually reopen elements of the Ahtisaari Package deserves particular attention. By seeking new arrangements in areas already regulated and exploiting ambiguities in the wording, Serbia may aim to gradually expand the powers of Serb community structures. This is a critical interpretation of the negotiating dynamic, not an aim proven by the draft statute alone. Nevertheless, it highlights an important asymmetry: while Belgrade continues to contest Kosovo’s statehood, Pristina is asked to make new institutional compromises without equivalent guarantees of recognition and international integration.

European integration: From political promise to procedural blockade

Concrete evidence of the limits of the Ohrid Agreement is the handling of Kosovo’s application for membership in the European Union. Since December 2022, eight presidencies have taken turns at the helm of the Council of the EU, but none has forwarded the application to the European Commission for assessment. Thus, nearly four years after the application was submitted, Kosovo has not even crossed the first threshold of formal review. By comparison, Serbia’s application was forwarded to the Commission after around ten months, Montenegro’s after four months, and North Macedonia’s after less than two months. The difference is not merely symbolic: it shows that Kosovo remains outside a procedure that other countries in the region began long ago.

This deadlock cannot be explained solely by shortcomings in domestic reforms. The European Commission’s report identifies difficulties in the judiciary, the fight against corruption, and the implementation of agreements with Serbia, but does not explicitly identify these shortcomings as reasons for not forwarding the application. Another obstacle is that five member states do not recognize Kosovo, and that integration is politically dependent on dialogue with Belgrade. The experience of visa liberalization is significant: even after fulfillment of the criteria was confirmed in 2018, visa-free travel took effect only in January 2024. But unlike that process, for which a defined roadmap existed, Kosovo currently has no clear procedural plan for obtaining candidate status. This uncertainty makes it all the more important to demand deadlines, measurable criteria, and mutual accountability.

Banjska and the limits of European normalization policy

The limits of the normalization process became particularly clear after the armed attack in Banjska on 24 September 2023, in which Kosovo police sergeant Afrim Bunjaku was killed. The European Commission’s 2026 report also notes the lack of accountability for this attack, demonstrating a double standard: diplomatic pressure focuses on Kosovo’s domestic steps, while Serbia’s non-implementation and destabilizing actions are not met with comparable consequences.

Faced with Russian and Chinese influence in the Western Balkans, European diplomacy has sought to keep Serbia tied to the EU. But prioritizing short-term stability over implementation of agreements weakens the credibility of the dialogue, especially when the process has no set deadline.

Serbia after Vučić: Change of power or nationalist continuity?

Recent political developments in Serbia — Aleksandar Vučić’s resignation from the presidency in September 2026 and the defeat of his party (SNS) by the “Student List” in the snap parliamentary elections of 25 October 2026 — must also be analyzed beyond the change of names at the top of the state. The fundamental problem in Kosovo–Serbia relations is not linked solely to Vučić as an individual, but to the continuity of a state concept that treats Kosovo as part of Serbia. A new government emerging from the protest movement against authoritarianism and corruption may bring domestic democratic reforms, but this in itself is no guarantee of a change in the nationalist course toward its neighbors. The decisive criterion for assessing the new government in Belgrade remains its concrete willingness to accept the reality of the state of Kosovo and to end its campaign to obstruct Kosovo internationally.

Conclusion: Kosovo cannot remain hostage to compromises without guarantees

On the eve of the third anniversary, the record is troubling: Kosovo’s European integration remains blocked, five EU states continue not to recognize it, and Serbia has not abandoned its contestation of Kosovo’s statehood. These developments do not prove a shared strategy by Brussels, Belgrade, and Moscow. They do, however, show that different interests can simultaneously constrain Kosovo’s international space. Therefore, the institutions should demand implementation of Article 4, transparency regarding conditionality in the Council of Europe, and constitutional guarantees for any new agreement.

The question for European diplomacy is not only when the Ohrid Agreement will be implemented, but how many more compromises Kosovo must make to enjoy equal international rights. Without verifiable implementation and Serbia’s abandonment of its policy of denying Kosovo’s statehood, normalization risks remaining the management of an endless conflict. At a time when enlargement is returning to the EU’s geopolitical agenda and Montenegro is advancing toward the conclusion of negotiations, the absence of a roadmap for Kosovo risks deepening its political and economic marginalization.

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