The President’s return of the law on the Special Court has prompted harsh public reactions. Accusations began that someone had buried the law, someone had drafted it badly; journalists, commentators and politicians from different camps got involved, accusing those who called for the law to be returned, or who supposedly drafted it badly, of treason […]
A Little Calm About the Law, Please

The President’s return of the law on the Special Court has prompted harsh public reactions. Accusations began that someone had buried the law, someone had drafted it badly; journalists, commentators and politicians from different camps got involved, accusing those who called for the law to be returned, or who supposedly drafted it badly, of treason. Accusations and hasty labels of treason seem to be in our blood, and we make them without knowing the circumstances and motives of those we accuse, and without being at the appropriate professional level to assess their work and deeds. Usually, those who do nothing are the first to accuse others of treason. I remember very well the accusations that Ibrahim Rugova was a traitor, and likewise those against Hashim Thaçi, often made by the very same people who speak today. Such labels do not help; they only poison what Kosovo needs most today, namely the unity of the Albanian political spectrum in confronting the hybrid warfare being waged against Kosovo through legal means (lawfare). The Special Court’s decision on Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Jakup Krasniqi and Rexhep Selimi is the clearest manifestation of this hybrid warfare, masked in the guise of justice. When the judge who read out this decision speaks of the alleged Special War Headquarters of the KLA against its opponents, he is in fact expressing what is being done through the Special Court against Kosovo. Division among Albanians and the incitement of political conflict between them serve only this hybrid warfare against Kosovo, at a time when, for the first time since 2015, when the Special Court was imposed, an opportunity has arisen for collective action to defend the values of the war and the dignity of the state of Kosovo.
The law was not written for Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Jakup Krasniqi and Rexhep Selimi. The law was written in response to the designation of the KLA General Staff and all its political and military structures as a joint criminal enterprise, something that criminalizes Kosovo’s entire liberation war, diminishes the legitimacy of the Republic of Kosovo itself and puts us on the political defensive, despite the fact that we were victims of Serbian aggression and genocide. When I hear Kosovar politicians say that the decision does not affect the KLA, I think they either have not read the decision, are ignorant, or are pleased with it; unfortunately, there seem to be quite a few such people among Albanians.
Drafting the law began on the day the Special Court’s decision was read out, at a moment when Kosovo was horrified, humiliated and completely disoriented by the decision. Something concrete had to be done, beyond lamenting, to find a way out of this situation, raise morale and find direction for political action against this humiliation. It became clear that faith in international justice and the help of allies had been an unforgivable political naivety, and that Kosovo had to act. There were calls to abolish the Special Court, but it was known that this would be almost impossible while the 2014 Exchange of Letters, ratified by Kosovo as an international agreement, remained in force. The alternative with the greatest chance of success was to limit the Special Court’s jurisdiction and return cases outside its jurisdiction to Kosovo’s regular courts, as provided for in the law that is now before the Assembly.
In 2022, the Special Court’s Constitutional Panel confirmed that the charges against Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Jakup Krasniqi and Rexhep Selimi went beyond the allegations made in the Dick Marty Report. The Panel also confirmed that the Special Court’s jurisdiction is defined neither by Kosovo’s Constitution nor by the 2014 Exchange of Letters, but solely by the law on the Special Court. The Panel said that because the Special Court has such broad jurisdiction under the law, there is nothing we can do, because Kosovo’s own Assembly gave it to us. Had Kosovo’s Assembly wanted to limit the Special Court’s jurisdiction to Dick Marty’s specific allegations, it would have done so by law; we are not to blame for the way you drafted the law. The Special Court forgets that the law was imposed on Kosovo by the EU and the US, but nevertheless did Kosovo a service by showing that it could have limited the Special Court’s jurisdiction to the specific allegations in the Dick Marty Report without violating the Constitution or the 2014 Exchange of Letters. The question that arises here is simply why Kosovo did not do this earlier, but waited for the disaster. I believe that naive faith in international justice and our allies is the reason, perhaps also ignorance.
The Special Court’s own decision showed the path that should have been taken. It was confirmed that Kosovo’s Constitutional Court, when it reviewed the constitutional amendments for establishing the Special Court, had also called for this court to have specific jurisdiction to address the specific allegations raised in the Dick Marty Report, rather than jurisdiction as broad as that set out in the law on the Special Court. Unfortunately, no one thought in 2015 to refer the law to the Constitutional Court, as it would most likely have been declared unconstitutional then.
It was also confirmed that the Special Court’s jurisdiction went beyond what Kosovo had undertaken to do in the 2014 Exchange of Letters. There, Kosovo undertook to establish a Special Court at the first-instance and appellate levels to hear charges that might arise from the EULEX Task Force (SITF), which had investigated the allegations raised in the Dick Marty Report. Two things are important here. First, Kosovo did not undertake to establish a Special Court at the level of the Supreme Court and the Special Court; it undertook to establish only a first-instance court and an appellate court. Second, the SITF investigation concerned only crimes committed after June 1999, and not before, because until then the Hague Tribunal (ICTY) had jurisdiction; in the Haradinaj and Limaj cases, it had dismissed the allegations that the KLA was a joint criminal enterprise. EULEX Prosecutor Williamson explicitly said in 2014 that the SITF’s sole purpose was to fill the legal vacuum created after June 1999. Despite this, the law imposed on Kosovo by the EU and the US gives the Special Court jurisdiction from 1 January 1998, entirely beyond what Kosovo undertook to do in the 2014 Exchange of Letters.
With the amendments to the law, as it now stands before the Assembly, the Special Court’s jurisdiction would be limited to precisely what Kosovo undertook to do, and cases outside this undertaking would be returned to Kosovo for trial. If anyone is to assess whether the KLA is a joint criminal enterprise or not, let Kosovo’s regular courts do it, not foreign judges with questionable backgrounds dating back to their time as members of EULEX, who turn out to be both investigators and judges.

















