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Who Guards the Guardians?

Who Guards the Guardians?

A few weeks after the judges handed down their judgment, a shared question has emerged among local and international critics of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? — Who guards the justice of the guardians of justice? Kosovo is unsettled. Not the «usual» constitutional and parliamentary turmoil we have experienced in recent years, with repeated elections […]

A few weeks after the judges handed down their judgment, a shared question has emerged among local and international critics of the Kosovo Specialist Chambers: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? — Who guards the justice of the guardians of justice?

Kosovo is unsettled. Not the «usual» constitutional and parliamentary turmoil we have experienced in recent years, with repeated elections and equally repeated failures to elect a speaker of parliament, a president, or deputy speakers of parliament — cases in which the Constitutional Court has had to have the final say each time.

Nor is it that other «usual» turmoil, caused by the government, under whose leadership Kosovo has endured half a decade of self-isolation and its diplomacy has self-destructed: with the suspension of the Strategic Dialogue by the US government, nearly three years of punitive EU sanctions, or a complete failure to persuade its closest allies of the reasonableness of Kosovo’s membership in the Council of Europe.

The latest crisis, which has engulfed not only the self-focused political spectrum but also broad segments of the population, inside Kosovo and in the diaspora, stems from the Specialist Chambers’ judgment in the “Thaci et al.” case. It handed the four co-founders of the armed liberation movement severe sentences totaling 81 years in prison, based on a dubious categorization of guerrilla resistance as a «joint criminal enterprise».

Two weeks after the sentences were handed down in The Hague, reactions in Kosovo are not fading. On the contrary, anger may grow even more intense. It may (or probably will) erupt into violence against parliament and the government.

After the preliminary judgment was announced (the full text, more than 2,000 pages long, rivals in length the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s genocide judgment against Mladić), it has still not been made public. Western embassies and the EU called for patience, calm, and a focus on the appeals process.

However, many of those angered by the judgment are no longer interested in what diplomats are saying. They remember the promise that this court would «lift the dark clouds» over Kosovo and the KLA after bizarre allegations of organ trafficking by prisoners. These allegations enabled the creation of a judicial chimera which, instead of pursuing its stated purpose, focused relentlessly on constructing a narrative that is a faithful copy of Russian and Serbian propaganda. After all, it was the Kurti government that successfully eroded, piece by piece and decision by decision, the credibility and influence of Western embassies in Kosovo — especially the American one.

Some of the most committed supporters of close ties with the US and the EU came from the parties of the former establishment — the ancien régime, as Kosovo’s Robespierrean leader, Albin Kurti, calls it. His party apparatchiks never miss an opportunity to post and declare, with barely concealed schadenfreude: «We told you so». Not only supporters of former President Thaci, but also a number of international observers and local civil society leaders feel betrayed by diplomats who washed their hands of their former promises.

But the rhetorical flourishes of the presiding judge, Charles Smith III, failed to bring closure to a process that lasted six years and was conducted under procedures that left alarming gaps in judicial accountability and transparency.

The respected Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales exposed an alarming culture of secrecy: confidential meetings for diplomats attended jointly by the court president and chief prosecutor, where the “Thaci et al.” case was discussed; materials passed to judges without giving the defence an opportunity to comment on them; a shameful lack of critical scrutiny of evidence provided by the Belgrade regime and unresolved questions about its provenance; and the president’s broad powers to assign judicial panels, including appellate panels, shielded from any meaningful challenge or appeal by precisely the people whose liberty is at stake.

What developments are shaping the dynamics and reactions as we speak?

First, Kosovo’s parliament unanimously adopted a declaration echoing one adopted last week by Albania’s parliament. Kosovo’s parliament rejected as unacceptable the finding that a common criminal purpose existed, called for coordinated legal and diplomatic action to defend the legitimacy of the liberation war, and pledged to protect both justice for victims and the accused’s right to a fair trial.

Second, the PDK has proposed a law to limit the powers of the Specialist Chambers after the appeals process in the Thaci et al. case is completed. The bill would limit the court’s jurisdiction to allegations of organ trafficking and crimes directly related to it, transfer other cases and further judicial review after the ongoing appeals have concluded to Kosovo’s courts, and establish independent international monitoring. It would also immediately cap the maximum prison sentence at 15 years, require sentences to be served in Kosovo, and enable presidential pardons.

Third, and perhaps most importantly, people are gathering every evening to protest in Pristina’s main squares under the slogan «Not in my name», while other protests are taking place across Kosovo and its diaspora, from Australia to Austria.

Behind them is the civic movement «Freedom Has a Name», founded by an eclectic mix of figures: Burbuqe Berisha, the late, award-winning theatre director; Lyrical Son, the hip-hop artist born in Pristina; Visar Kryeziu, the renowned Associated Press photographer; Ismail Tasholli, a philosophy student in Graz, where he is writing his doctoral thesis on technology and philosophy; and Eliza Hoxha, a former pop singer, architect, and contemporary artist. Hoxha is the only one of them connected to the PDK, as a former member of parliament, but the crowds appear to represent a broader social spectrum.

I have attended most of the protests with my wife. The nightly gatherings follow a set formula: they begin at 8 p.m. with the recitation of the former KLA soldier’s oath. Banners bearing portraits of the four KLA leaders sentenced in The Hague hang on the main stage. The opening speech emphasizes the main demands: adoption of the proposed law and additional funds for the appeals process.

Then come the speakers, an equally eclectic group: war veterans, children of KLA martyrs, well-known pop singers, and other public figures. One evening it was Yll Limani, perhaps the most famous pop singer to come out of Kosovo, with millions of social media followers. Ledri Vula, one of Kosovo’s best-known hip-hop artists, has also taken part. On another evening, the keynote speaker was Leart Ajvazaj, an accomplished mathematician and machine-learning engineer, with degrees in pure mathematics from Yale and Cambridge, who now leads pioneering artificial intelligence research. Opera singers, folk musicians, journalists, former political prisoners from Yugoslav times, and footballers have also spoken or sung.

Many participants are war veterans, but most appear to belong to Generation Z. Young people who may have joined after seeing support for the protests on TikTok from global stars such as Dua Lipa and Rita Ora.

The tension is palpable. And one thing is certain: no political party will be able to control the emotions (or actions) unless a solution is found through institutional means.

What might those means be?

A rational way forward would be for the governing regime and the opposition to agree on passing the law and allocating a budget that covers not only lawyers’ fees but also lobbying efforts to better explain the main objections and grievances Kosovars have regarding the Specialist Chambers’ procedures, the judgment, and the legally incestuous relationship between its chambers, which operate in a closed environment without external checks and balances, or even the most basic monitoring.

I strongly doubt Kurti will ever agree to this sequence of steps.

First and foremost, the polarization of recent years has deepened distrust between the parties. Kurti insists that a president be elected first. And, as if to make the storm even more dangerous, the Constitutional Court has issued a new judgment in the case of the Missing President: if lawmakers fail to elect a president by October 6, the country will face its fourth parliamentary election in two years, most likely on Sunday, November 15, 2026.

Kurti appears to be using the opposition’s demand for the bill to be passed as a bargaining chip to secure a president of his choosing. PDK leader Hamza has publicly pledged to vote for a president, but only after the law is passed. The gap is wide and compounded by electoral calculations.

But even if parliament passes the law, I expect the Specialist Chambers’ own Constitutional Chamber to block its key provisions. Having previously rejected changes to its mandate and insisted that it continues until the EU Council orders it to end, the court has left Kosovo’s elected representatives facing an institution they themselves established, but whose future lies exclusively in Brussels, the capital of its main funder.

So, what remains to be done?

Perhaps it is simply wishful thinking to expect the court’s sponsors (especially Washington) to signal that an institution determined at all costs to rewrite Kosovo’s history, whether deliberately or through a shocking lack of understanding, cannot become an instrument of endless punishment for the leaders of a people who were victims of war. To insist that the appeals process be independent not only of the «influence» of protesters in Pristina, as fearmongers in the Specialist Chambers claim, but also of the biases displayed by the court’s own leadership. To reach an agreement that honors victims’ rights, regardless of national or political affiliation, respects due process, and ensures that Kosovo’s history and the fate of its liberation leaders are not left hostage to bureaucrats who seem more concerned with keeping their tabs open at The Hague’s restaurants than representing the «people of Kosovo», as their mandate requires.

Other agreements could follow: advancing Kosovo’s bid for membership in the Council of Europe, so that both the accused and alleged victims can ultimately seek protection of their rights at the European Court of Human Rights as a final legal remedy.

All of this would require coordination, trust and, above all, attention from key allies — a commodity currently in short supply.

Kosovo handed over part of its sovereignty to the custodians — the guardians — of justice, if you’ll allow me a banal reference to Alan Moore’s famous graphic novel.

Sadly, I fear there will be no one to guard the guardians.

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