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The Right to Life and the Responsibility of the State

The Right to Life and the Responsibility of the State

The essence of the state’s positive obligations to protect life lies in the fact that the state cannot be satisfied with merely responding after a life has been lost. It must act in advance when circumstances make its intervention necessary and reasonable. The case of the late Arlinda Zekaj raises serious issues […]

The essence of the state’s positive obligations to protect life lies in the fact that the state cannot be satisfied with merely responding after a life has been lost. It must act in advance when circumstances make its intervention necessary and reasonable.

The case of the late Arlinda Zekaj raises serious questions about the responsibility of the state. According to information made public, she had complained about the handling of previous cases and, on October 22, had written to the Chief Prosecutor in Peja, warning of the danger she faced. Three days later, on October 25, she was killed.

Legal standards and judicial practice

Article 25 of the Constitution of Kosovo guarantees the right to life, while Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) obliges the state, in certain circumstances, to take concrete measures to protect life from the actions of other persons.

Furthermore, Articles 18, paragraph 4, 50, paragraph 1, 51, paragraph 1, and 55, paragraph 1, of the Istanbul Convention set out the state’s obligations to take preventive and protective action, assess risk, and provide effective protection to the victim, without making this conditional on her willingness to initiate or continue criminal proceedings.

According to the standard established by the European Court of Human Rights in a case against the United Kingdom in 1998, the state may be held responsible when the authorities knew or ought to have known that a person faced a real and immediate risk to their life, but failed to take measures that could reasonably have been expected of them to prevent it.

In this regard, Judgment KI129/21 of the Constitutional Court in the case of the late Sebahate Morina is one of the most important decisions concerning the state’s constitutional responsibility to protect the lives of victims of domestic violence.

This judgment clarifies that the state does not fulfil its obligation to protect life merely by adopting laws and establishing institutional mechanisms. It must also ensure their effective implementation, particularly when the authorities know or ought to know that there is a real risk to life.

In that case, the Court found fundamental failures by the competent authorities, including:

1. Failure to respond immediately to the report of domestic violence.

2. Failure to conduct a proper risk assessment, which must be autonomous, proactive, and immediate.

3. Failure to assess the real and immediate risk to life, even though the authorities knew or ought to have known of it, particularly given that the victim’s husband had previously been convicted of domestic violence.

4. Failure to take measures to protect her life.

The state’s obligation does not mean an absolute guarantee that every death can be prevented, but the assessment must focus on what the authorities knew or ought to have known before the incident and whether they had taken reasonable measures that could have been expected of them,

to prevent the tragic outcome.

Three levels of responsibility

Institutional failure, in itself, is not sufficient to establish legal responsibility. Nevertheless, the circumstances require an examination of three levels of responsibility:

First, the responsibility of the state, which concerns the authorities’ failure to fulfil their positive obligations to protect life.

Second, individual, disciplinary, or criminal responsibility, which concerns the breach of legal obligations by specific officials.

Third, procedural responsibility, which concerns the obligation to conduct an effective, independent, and comprehensive investigation into both the circumstances of the murder and the possible actions or omissions of the institutions.

These responsibilities are interconnected, but they are not the same. The state’s responsibility for a violation of Article 2 of the ECHR does not necessarily require the criminal conviction of an official. Likewise, an administrative error does not in itself prove a violation of the right to life.

What needs to be investigated?

Beyond the criminal prosecution of the suspected perpetrator of the murder, the investigation must also clarify the following issues:

1. How were the late woman’s previous reports, information, and warnings about violence and threats handled?

2. Was a professional and documented risk assessment carried out?

3. Was the protection order actually enforced, and were the measures commensurate with the specific risk?

4. How was the late woman’s complaint dated October 22 handled, and what actions were taken following it?

5. Was there effective coordination between the Police, the Prosecution, the court, and other services?

6. Were there other necessary measures that could have been taken to protect the late woman’s life?

Responsibility must be addressed

The case of the late Arlinda Zekaj requires a serious and comprehensive investigation into the fulfilment of the state’s obligations to protect life.

A final finding of a violation of Article 25 of the Constitution, Article 2 of the ECHR, and the relevant provisions of the Istanbul Convention requires an examination of all the evidence and specific circumstances.

All the more so since it is now clear that the authorities knew of the real and immediate risk to her life, and why measures that could reasonably have been expected of them were not taken.

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