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Tirana’s Fire and Pristina’s Patience

Tirana’s Fire and Pristina’s Patience

In Tirana these days, discontent has moved out of statistical reports and into the streets. Students, young people, citizens. A protest that began with the university, the cost of studies, the lack of support and the poor prospects after graduation, and that very quickly became linked to corruption, privilege, property and the feeling that opportunities in Albania are not being shared equally […]

In Tirana these days, discontent has moved out of statistical reports and into the streets. Students, young people, citizens. A protest that began with the university, the cost of studies, the lack of support and the poor prospects after graduation, and that very quickly became linked to corruption, privilege, property and the feeling that opportunities in Albania are not being shared equally.

The luxury project in Zvërnec may have been one of the sparks. But the gasoline seems to have been gathering for much longer.

Albania today is an interesting place to observe this contrast. It has visible wealth. It has construction. It has a coastline that is becoming increasingly expensive. It has tourism. It has luxury cars, exclusive restaurants, giant towers and a Tirana that wants to look like a European metropolis.

Yet, in that same Albania, 19 per cent of the population was at risk of poverty in 2025 and 31.2 per cent lived in severe material and social deprivation, according to INSTAT. This is where the problem begins.

Citizens do not revolt only when they have nothing. They also revolt when they see that some have a lot, that wealth is accumulating around them, but their own work is not enough to buy even a minimum level of security. When housing gets more expensive every day, schools weaken, work offers no prospects, and meanwhile they see another class living in a completely different reality.

Poverty is an economic problem. But the feeling that the game is rigged becomes a political problem.

And that is why Tirana should matter to us in Pristina, too. Not because Kosovo is Albania.

It isn’t.

But because here, too, we have a question worth asking: given all the economic pressure that every citizen and every Kosovo family is feeling, why is this pressure not producing more social tension?

In September, annual inflation in Kosovo was 6.7 % . Housing, water, energy and fuels were 15.2 % more expensive than a year earlier. Transport was up 10.5 %. Meanwhile, the average net wage in the private sector during 2025 was close to 600 euros, according to the KAS.

But the problems facing a Kosovo family do not end at the neighbourhood grocery store. If someone in the family becomes seriously ill tomorrow, what happens?

The European Commission estimates that around 40 per cent of healthcare spending in Kosovo is paid directly out of citizens’ pockets. Progress towards universal health coverage remains very limited.

So the middle class pays taxes. Then it pays again for the doctor and medicine.

We have a similar paradox in education, too.

Kosovo had planned around 474 million euros, or 4.5 % of GDP, for education and research in 2024, almost the EU average. But PISA results show that the average 15-year-old student in Kosovo is almost four and a half years of schooling behind their EU peers.

So the problem is not just how much money we put into education. The problem is what kind of education we buy with that money.

This is how a class emerges that is not necessarily poor, but lives in constant insecurity. It works. It earns a wage. It pays taxes. Then it has to privately buy part of the healthcare, education, housing and security that the state should be providing more of.

And yet Kosovo remains relatively calm.

Why?

Albert Hirschman, one of the most important economists and political thinkers of the 20th century, especially known for his work on economic development and citizens’ behaviour towards institutions, summed up the response to a system that does not work in three words: exit, voice, loyalty.

To leave. – EXIT

To speak up. – VOICE

Or to keep believing. – LOYALTY

In Kosovo, this framework becomes almost tangible.

Exit is emigration.

Voice is protest, the demand for change, pressure on those in power.

Loyalty is the willingness to give the system a little more time, especially when you still believe that those governing, with all their mistakes, are not governing in order to enrich themselves.

And remittances and social transfers make this patience a little more affordable. They are not loyalty. But they lower its cost.

In this sense, Kosovo today has four powerful shock absorbers.

THE FIRST SHOCK ABSORBER IS THE DIASPORA. In 2025, around 1.4 billion euros came into Kosovo in remittances alone. According to the World Bank, this is equivalent to around 17.3 per cent of GDP.

This is no small amount of support. It is a parallel social system. When your pension does not cover your needs, money comes from Germany. When you need a doctor, Switzerland helps. When tuition needs to be paid, a house built or a bad month got through, the diaspora steps in where wages and the state fall short.

Without planning it, Kosovo has built a kind of private welfare state beyond its borders.

THE SECOND SHOCK ABSORBER IS EMIGRATION. In 2024 alone, 37,451 people emigrated from Kosovo. Net migration was minus 28,413. Even with positive natural growth, the resident population shrank by more than 17,000 people.

Here is the paradox.

When a 25-year-old sees no prospects, they can seek change here. Or they can seek a life somewhere else.

In many countries, discontent spills into the streets. In Kosovo, some of it goes to the airport. Then the person who left starts sending money. The system loses a citizen and gains a remittance. Individually, it may be a success. Collectively, however, it is a diagnosis.

THE THIRD SHOCK ABSORBER IS SOCIAL TRANSFERS. Pensions have increased. Child and maternity benefits have expanded. Direct payments to families have increased. And these measures work. Of course they work. If you add 20, 30 or 50 euros a month to a family’s income, you have made life easier for them.

But here we have another paradox.

In Kosovo, 56.8 per cent of the working-age population was economically inactive in 2024. Among women, the figure was 74.1 per cent. This does not mean that three out of four women are unemployed. It means that three out of four were not even active in the labour market.

And part of the explanation is very concrete.

Only around one in five children up to the age of six is in nursery or preschool education, while the World Bank notes that more than half of women outside the labour force cite family responsibilities as the reason. So we give the family a child benefit, but very often we do not give the mother the childcare place that would enable her to go to work.

A transfer makes the month easier. But childcare, work and a wage change her life.

And this is the difference between social policy that cushions the blow and development policy that empowers.

THE FOURTH SHOCK ABSORBER IS SOMETHING ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. It is moral legitimacy.

A large part of Albin Kurti’s political capital continues to come from the belief among some citizens that, despite mistakes, conflicts, arrogance or a lack of results in certain sectors, this government did not come to enrich itself personally.

This is a political perception. It is not proof that corruption has disappeared from Kosovo. It hasn’t.

But in politics, perceptions of fairness matter. In the IRI poll in May 2024, 60 per cent of respondents rated the government’s performance in the fight against corruption as very good or somewhat good.

This is not a clean bill of health. It is an indicator of political capital.
A citizen may forgive a government’s incompetence for a while. They find it much harder to forgive theft.

If you believe that the government is honest, even when you think it does not work, you are willing to wait a little longer. That, too, cushions discontent.

So Kosovo has four shock absorbers today.

The diaspora supports the family.

Emigration pushes some of the pressure outwards.

The state distributes transfers.

Moral legitimacy buys patience.

So far, they have worked. Perhaps even better than we are willing to admit.

But a shock absorber is not an engine. It only softens the impact. Remittances are not a development economy. Emigration is not an employment policy. Social benefits are not productivity. And moral integrity, real or perceived, cannot replace results indefinitely.

This brings us back to Tirana.

We do not know whether what is happening in Albania today will happen in Kosovo tomorrow. The societies are not the same. Nor is the politics. But the streets of Tirana remind us of a simple truth.

Calm does not always mean contentment. Sometimes it is simply pressure that still has somewhere to go.

In Albania, some of that pressure has now spilled into the streets.

In Kosovo, there is still somewhere for it to go. To a transfer from the state. To money from the diaspora. To the belief that, at least, the government is not stealing. Or to the airport.

The question is not why Kosovo is not protesting today. The question is what happens when one day these shock absorbers can no longer bear the weight.

Tirana, these days, may be giving us part of the answer.

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