Vučić’s “military alliance” between Zagreb, Tirana and Pristina is nineteen months old and has never existed. Its return to political discourse, just three days before elections he may lose, shows where Belgrade will seek a diversion if the results are contested. Three days before the elections in Serbia, […]
Vučić Is Using the “Military Alliance” to Divert Attention from Elections in Serbia

Vučić’s “military alliance” between Zagreb, Tirana and Pristina is nineteen months old and has never existed. Its return to political discourse, just three days before elections he may lose, shows where Belgrade will seek a diversion if the results are contested.
Three days before the elections in Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić found the enemy again. “A few months ago, a military alliance was created between Pristina, Zagreb and Tirana. Against whom did they create this military alliance? Not against Austria, Switzerland or Norway, but against Serbia. We understood this message and continued to strengthen our army.”
This alliance does not exist. What does exist is a declaration on cooperation in the field of defence, signed by the three defence ministers in Tirana in March 2025. The declaration covers interoperability, training, the defence industry and hybrid threats. It has been in effect for nineteen months. Two of the three signatory states are NATO members and do not need another alliance to guarantee their defence. Belgrade knows this. Plenković told Vučić so directly. The Croatian government also made this clear in an official written statement during the week the document was signed.
In Brussels, in March 2025, Vučić declared that the three states had “started an arms race in our region” and that Serbia had “understood the message”. In Beijing, in September 2025, he claimed the alliance had been created “not because of Austria, Hungary or Slovenia, but because of Serbia”. In Mladenovac, in February 2026, he declared that Zagreb “hopes for a change of power in Serbia”. A week later, he claimed the alliance had been designed “not for defensive operations, but for offensive operations”. In Munich, it became “the greatest threat to the Republic of Serbia”, while the same statement was followed by a concrete response: up to 40 percent of Serbian arms production would be redirected to the needs of the army.
Each time the audience changed, so did the nature of the threat: a violation of treaties for the NATO audience, an aggressor for the audience in Beijing, and a budget line for the audience in Munich. This week, the audience is the undecided voter. Neutral states are a new element in this narrative. Austria, Switzerland and Norway are countries the average Serbian citizen associates with states that do not attack anyone and are not in conflict with their neighbours. The sentence is constructed in such a way as to present Serbia as the exception to this rule.
The election race is tighter than expected in Belgrade. The NSPM poll, published on October 20, gives the Student List 44.5 percent of the vote and Vučić’s list 42.7 percent, figures that refer to decided voters. Dačić’s SPS is at 2.9 percent, below the electoral threshold. Other polls still put Vučić in the lead, but the trend over the past month has been in only one direction. Meanwhile, student columns are arriving in Belgrade today for the campaign’s closing rally.
A party that has been in power for fourteen years is facing the possibility of a result it may not be willing to accept. The result will be counted by a commission over which the government exercises control, in a country whose streets have been filled with protesters for two years.
The security concern is the vote count in Belgrade.
A contested vote-counting process requires an event that can shift the cameras’ attention. Northern Kosovo is where Serbia has already practised this scenario: the barricades of December 2022, the attack in Banjska in September 2023 and declarations of combat readiness from the direction of Raška.
The Serb List is a branch of the SNS, as its leader himself admitted on Nova TV. Advanced Serbian army units are deployed near the border. An incident during a patrol, an injured Serb, the arrest of a “Serbian citizen” or the stopping of a convoy at Jarinje could create a new situation within an afternoon. Meanwhile, the media machinery, which for nineteen months has described a Croatian-Albanian army near Serbia’s border, will need no further instructions to explain what such an incident is supposed to mean.
Vučić has already told his voters, during an appearance in Lazarevac on October 15, that Albanians support the Student List and that the protests were financed with Picula’s money. The claim about the alliance completes this narrative: the opposition is presented as a foreign instrument, the neighbours as armed, and the contested elections as a front line.
Whatever happens on Sunday, the ten days after the polling stations close are the period when a diversion would serve the ruling party most, while being least expected by everyone else. KFOR has a new commander, General Vergori, who has just taken up the post.
Attention should be focused on northern Kosovo, from the closing of the polling stations until the results are announced. If Vučić wins by a narrow margin, the Kosovo issue could be used to demonstrate strength. If he loses, Kosovo remains the only theatre where he can directly shape the news agenda and divert attention from domestic political developments.
In either case, the claim about the alliance has already done part of the work: it has told the Serbian public in advance whom to blame.
For nineteen months, Vučić has taught his country to perceive an army on its southern border as a threat. Three days before the elections, he told them when to turn their gaze in that direction. The threat has a date.

















