A generational shift is reshaping politics in Serbia and Albania. This has major implications beyond their borders, particularly for security in the Western Balkans as a whole and for EU enlargement. It offers the West—which is often wary of instability and change—a new opportunity to steer […]
As Generation Z asserts itself in Serbia and Albania, the positives for the West far outweigh the headaches

A generational shift is reshaping politics in Serbia and Albania. This has major implications beyond their borders, particularly for security in the Western Balkans as a whole and for EU enlargement. It offers the West—which is often wary of instability and change—a new opportunity to steer the region toward the objectives of the EU and NATO.
What began two years ago as a nationwide student protest in Serbia, following the deaths of sixteen people in the collapse of a railway station, which was linked to allegations of corruption, has now produced one of the most significant upheavals in the political history of the Balkans.
On October 25, an electoral list created by students, which included many newcomers to politics, won an early parliamentary election by a landslide, despite restrictive conditions for democracy. By presenting the vote as a referendum against the political establishment and spurring record turnout, the Student List managed, against all expectations, to end former president Aleksandar Vučić’s fourteen-year dominance of Serbian politics, while also decimating all the other traditional opposition parties.
In neighboring Albania, a NATO member, a peaceful movement led by Generation Z against luxury coastal developments and elite corruption has recently turned into broader protests, mostly led by students, some of which have degenerated into violence. Protesters are calling for a change of the political establishment, particularly an end to the long-standing duopoly of Prime Minister Edi Rama and opposition leader Sali Berisha. For most of October, unrest has engulfed the center of Tirana. Rama’s government, now in its thirteenth year in power, has struggled to maintain control despite its strong parliamentary majority.
Serbia and Albania have very different political contexts, as well as very limited social and cultural ties with each other. Nevertheless, the political upheaval in Belgrade is resonating in Tirana too.
There is a geopolitical reason for this. Over the past decade, Rama and Vučić have to some extent acted as guarantors of the preservation of stability in the Western Balkans, enabled by Western policies to contain tensions in the region. With their broader influence across the Balkans, they have served as the West’s anchors for regional stability in exchange for tacit Western support for their governance—a model of rule that scholars and observers have described as “stabilocracy.”
The irony is that now it is Rama and Vučić’s opponents—a new generation of Albanians and Serbs—who may be sharing insights and expressing solidarity with each other. The election in Serbia offers Albania’s still-fragile protest movement a model for political action, far more productive than the movement turning into a phenomenon characterized by directionless unrest.
Beyond the geopolitical perspective
All too often, Western capitals view developments in the Balkans through a narrow, self-interested geopolitical lens. The main concern for many Western leaders is the extent to which Moscow is exploiting or fueling events, but even when protests are entirely homegrown, political unrest raises concerns about regional instability, its implications for EU enlargement, and the security of strategic assets such as energy and transport corridors.
The West has valid reasons to be concerned. Although the Student List’s impressive achievement in Serbia may earn it international goodwill, it remains a heterogeneous, leaderless structure that mobilized the majority of voters around a lowest common denominator: defeating Vučić. It must now resolve divisive issues and prove that an anti-establishment organization governed through a committee can run state institutions, many of which continue to be dominated by loyalists of the former regime.
On paper, the Student List’s foreign and security policy orientation is largely identical to Vučić’s. It seeks military neutrality and EU membership, alongside incompatible goals of maintaining strong ties with Russia and China, including opposition to sanctions against Moscow. It also remains firmly within the framework of Serbian nationalism, which does not reassure Serbia’s neighbors. Nevertheless, these goals were not among the campaign’s main issues and may not be emphasized in practice—particularly if Serbia meaningfully resumes its engagement with the EU.
Albania, by contrast, is a NATO member and aims to complete its EU accession negotiations by the end of 2027. It has made rapid progress in this process, largely thanks to Western-backed anti-corruption reforms and the work of the Special Structure against Corruption, known as SPAK, which has challenged the country’s culture of impunity by investigating and bringing charges against a number of powerful figures, including people from Rama’s inner circle.
In fact, the protest movement has been driven largely by public discontent over high-level corruption exposed by SPAK investigations. In this sense, the protests can be seen as a sign that the conditionality of the EU accession process is doing its transformative work. But the recent escalation of the protests into violence risks taking Albania off its path toward the EU if it merely produces instability without creating political avenues for continuing reforms.
Although the West has legitimate concerns that Generation Z is stirring things up in the Balkans at such a delicate moment, these concerns should not dictate its policy. Young people are rebelling against paternalistic governance; they are not acting on behalf of Russia or China. Treating them as pawns in great-power competition would be detached from reality and counterproductive. Since political accountability is the protesters’ main demand, the EU is their natural ally. The West can help anchor these new democratic actors if it engages with them on the terms they set for themselves.
A series of decisive tests
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s immediate response to the election result in Serbia underscored this clear point of convergence between the EU and Serbia’s future government. In a social media post, she specifically listed as EU priorities “support for rule-of-law reforms, media freedom, the fight against corruption and strong democratic institutions.” Serbia may soon begin making progress in its stalled EU accession process if the next government starts delivering on this front. Some of these reforms, for example, would enable greater oversight of Chinese investments and could help rewrite the rules of engagement between Belgrade and Beijing.
As the EU renews its relations with Serbia, it should not neglect the regional implications of the Student List’s stance on foreign and security policy, as well as its approach to Russia, for fear of undermining the movement’s lack of consensus on these issues. The true decisive test of the country’s commitment to EU membership will be good neighborly relations. Specifically, Serbia’s stance toward Montenegro, as the latter approaches the completion of its EU accession process, toward Milorad Dodik’s secessionist agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and toward the normalization of relations with Kosovo will matter.
Although a future government led by the Student List may postpone the most divisive foreign policy issues, good neighborly relations should be a minimum expectation. They are also in Serbia’s interest, since sufficiently good relations could serve as a potential step toward future alignment with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
The EU’s challenge in Albania is at once simpler and more complicated. SPAK, as the cornerstone of the accession process, has been a catalyst for political transformation, and protecting it from political interference should remain a decisive test of the EU’s engagement with actors in the country.
The EU’s responses against the unrest and calls for grievances to be channeled through the political process are reasonable. But the EU should also continue to scrutinize closely the excessive measures taken by a candidate state to suppress legitimate dissent and the use of violence against protesters. EU membership is a shared goal for a broad segment of Albanian society and is not a monopoly that can be guaranteed by only one government. The only way for Albania to join the EU is to address the uneven playing field in its political democracy, which contributes to the emergence of symptoms such as political violence.
And there remains one final consideration: Will the United States and the EU be aligned on this issue? Washington has been somewhat quiet in recent weeks, continuing the pattern of inconsistent and ad hoc engagement in the region over the past two years. The Trump administration issued a statement condemning the unrest in Albania, while its initial response to the election in Serbia came only in answers to media questions; an official statement from the US Embassy followed five days later.
Of course, Washington has separate bilateral agendas, strategic dialogues and economic projects with Serbia and Albania, none of which appear to be under threat, as well as influence it can use if it chooses. Nevertheless, its slow response to such important developments signals a lack of clear focus and strategic interest in the region. The great significance and opportunities offered by this transformative moment call for greater ambition.

















