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When the Aggressor Writes the Case File in The Hague and the Victim Rests on Its Laurels: From Victory in War to Defeat in Memory

When the Aggressor Writes the Case File in The Hague and the Victim Rests on Its Laurels: From Victory in War to Defeat in Memory

This article had been sitting as a draft on my computer for several days, while I refused to believe I would have to publish it in such a bleak version. Unfortunately, the conviction of the four KLA leaders in The Hague confirmed even my most extreme fear that international justice had capitulated to political bias and […]

This article had been sitting as a draft on my computer for several days, while I refused to believe I would have to publish it in such a bleak version. Unfortunately, the conviction of the four KLA leaders in The Hague confirmed even my most extreme fear that international justice had capitulated to political bias and historical revisionism. Until the very last minute, I hoped that legal reason, the universal standards of Western law, and the incontestable truth of a war of survival would triumph over political engineering. But the conviction of all four—Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi, and Jakup Krasniqi—by the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague put an end to every illusion. This decision does not mark the triumph of justice, but the final seal on the deep political bias of a mechanism born crooked, on false premises, operating in violation of European standards of due process, and ending as an instrument of historical revisionism.

This judgment is not a bolt from the blue, but the forewarned finale of a process built on foundations of serious procedural violations and geopolitical compromises. For almost six years, the four central figures of the Kosovo Liberation Army and its state-building effort were held in pretrial detention without a first-instance verdict, with the trial beginning only two and a half years after their arrest. This delay destroyed the fundamental principle of the presumption of innocence and Article 5(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights, turning the proceedings themselves into an administrative punishment. All the more so since the repeated rejection of guarantees offered by sovereign European states for conditional release was based on entirely abstract grounds.

Nevertheless, this court’s greatest scandal lies in its geopolitical origins. The Specialist Court was not born of the ideal of international justice, but as a fully-fledged Russian diplomatic and intelligence operation, conceived and led by Konstantin Kosachev, chair of the Russian Duma’s Committee on Foreign Affairs and head of the Russian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Immediately after Kosovo declared independence in 2008, it was Kosachev’s official initiative that set the Council of Europe mechanism in motion, exploiting an institutional environment deeply penetrated by Russian lobbying and influence under Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland, in order to delegitimize Kosovo’s statehood and NATO’s intervention.

This Moscow intrigue was packaged through Dick Marty’s infamous report and the macabre fabrications about “organ trafficking” at the so-called “Yellow House.” But the fatal blow to Kosovo did not come from Moscow; it came from Washington’s ruthless political climate. President Barack Obama’s administration, intent on securing the nuclear deal with Iran (JCPOA) at any cost and avoiding direct confrontations with Russia in the UN Security Council, used Kosovo as a geopolitical bargaining chip. Pristina was put to a brutal ultimatum: either vote to establish the Specialist Court through constitutional amendments, or Russia would pass a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to create an international tribunal that the US could not veto. Kosovo was forced to put itself on trial to serve a global deal between the great powers. And when the day of legal reckoning came, the entire fable used to blackmail a whole nation evaporated, because the final indictment contained not a single letter about organ trafficking. In its place, the prosecution recycled the elastic doctrine of the “Joint Criminal Enterprise” to criminalize a guerrilla, asymmetrical and decentralized movement of survival.

The conviction constitutes a dangerous attempt to criminalize the very structure of the liberation resistance and, inevitably, to stain the legitimacy of NATO’s 1999 intervention and the international doctrine of humanitarian intervention.

Nevertheless, the blame for this national catastrophe does not lie only in The Hague and Western capitals; responsibility also rests in Pristina and Tirana. We faced an international court as a nation without archives, institutionalized memory, public diplomacy, or state strategy, against an aggressor that entered the legal battlefield with a well-oiled, thirty-year-old machine. While in Pristina and Tirana history was treated as anniversary folklore or ammunition for the day’s electoral squabbles, Belgrade elevated the doctrine of revisionism to the level of national security from the very beginning of Yugoslavia’s breakup. As early as 1992, through a special parliamentary law, Serbia established the state Museum of Genocide Victims, creating the first centralized research base for producing files with legal and political weight.

Behind this apparatus stood not amateur initiatives or the wishes of volunteers, but the entire state infrastructure: the Military Archives of the Armed Forces, the State Archives of Yugoslavia, the Institute of Contemporary History, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), and the intelligence services (DB, later BIA). As early as 1998–2000, this machine prepared “white books” on the so-called crimes of Albanian separatism, systematically translated them into English and French, distributed them to the West’s major academic libraries, and supplied every international channel for decades (from ICTY Tribunal files to Dick Marty’s report and the records of the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office). Serbia funded scholarly monographs, research chairs, and internationally peer-reviewed publications, creating an interpretive monopoly that sought to dress a guerrilla movement of survival in the guise of a violent syndicate.

Peoples with a sense of statehood know that historical memory is preserved only through global institutionalization. Armenians have established a network of archives, institutes, and university chairs (such as at UCLA), from Yerevan to Washington and Paris, registering a full 327 memorials in 45 countries. Ukrainians turned the tragedy of the Holodomor into an internationally recognized parliamentary issue through national museums and research consortia at the Universities of Alberta and Harvard. Similarly, Rwanda made its memory official state policy through university study centers, culminating in the inclusion of four of its principal memorials (Nyamata, Murambi, Gisozi, and Bisesero) on the UNESCO World Heritage List.

Albanians, meanwhile, continue to rely on the naive belief that historical truth will be recognized on its own. Faced with intensive Serbian-Russian state organization, the Albanian world displayed a shocking institutional desert.

For a quarter of a century, Kosovo failed to build a single consolidated national archive in accordance with international scholarly protocols. The task of documenting victims and the disappeared was not undertaken by the sovereign state, but delegated to a nongovernmental organization such as the Humanitarian Law Center. The public Institute for the Investigation of War Crimes was unceremoniously closed by administrative decision in 2018 and remained defunct for five years, revived by law only at the end of 2023—precisely after The Hague investigations had concluded and the prosecution files had been locked down.

Testimonies were left scattered in private drawers, brigade archives were hidden or destroyed out of fear and distrust, while official Tirana never found the courage to establish a research institute or a permanent national exhibition on the crimes committed against Albanians in the twentieth century. In this dramatic asymmetry, the four KLA leaders entered the courtroom stripped of their state’s shield: facing prosecutors who read files meticulously compiled by Belgrade’s archivists, they had to reconstruct from their detention cells, through individual testimony and fragmented memories, the reality of an asymmetrical war that their state had never bothered to document in the language international justice understands.

Kosovo failed to build this defense because it was poisoned by internal political self-cannibalism and strategic short-sightedness. For a quarter of a century, the liberation war was not treated as a foundational consensus of statehood, but as electoral fireworks for the pursuit of daily power. Part of the leadership privatized the credit for liberation, using national sacrifice as a moral shield for bad governance, corruption, and the inflation of veteran lists. On the other hand, to break this monopoly on power, political rivals fell into the destructive trap of demonizing the KLA itself: rather than targeting administrative corruption, they began portraying the liberation movement as a criminal enterprise, producing files, accusations, and testimony whispered about in Western ambassadors’ offices. The creation of the Specialist Court was quietly welcomed by segments of the political establishment as an external purge chamber for getting rid of rivals who could not be defeated at the ballot box. Prosecutors in The Hague did not need to do the hard work; they simply had to collect the poison our elites poured over one another in parliament and on television.

This myopia was compounded by the cynical provincialism of official Tirana. For decades, Albania’s political elite operated on the assumption that avoiding difficult questions about the past could be sold as regional maturity, trading memory to buy short-term political support from international actors. The Albanian state enthusiastically developed the “Besa” Museum in Vlora, dedicated to the noble rescue of Jews; an unquestionably noble act that merits commemoration, but one that exposes the state’s glaring hypocrisy. In fact, Albania invests where it can appear as a savior praised by the world, but refuses to establish even a single institute or national exhibition for our national tragedies. Albania has no museum or permanent exhibition that comprehensively addresses the experience of Albanians under Yugoslavia and Serbia: the expulsions of 1877–1878 from Niš, the massacres of the Balkan Wars, colonization, the exchange of the southern population after the Treaty of Lausanne, agrarian reform, the ethnic cleansing of Çamëria, deportations to Turkey, the Tivar massacre, Ranković’s repression, the 1981 demonstrations, the abolition of autonomy, and the crimes of 1998–1999. This entire legacy of state-led ethnic cleansing is swept under the rug by Tirana’s political elite, which has chosen self-censorship for fear of damaging the false façade of regional stability and diplomatic convenience with its neighbors.

This capitulation of memory deprives Kosovo of its most powerful strategic weapon in international relations. The painful past must never serve merely as a reactive shield in court; it must be the foundation of our diplomatic offensive. In the dialogue with Serbia, abandoning a state archive of war crimes gave mediators room to turn the process into an artificial moral equivalence between the two sides. Institutionally documented memory must restore political conditionality; normalization cannot exist without an acknowledgment of guilt, war reparations, clarification of the fate of the missing, and the return of funds and artifacts looted by Belgrade. Likewise, in the struggle for international recognition and membership in the UN, the Council of Europe, and UNESCO, rigorous documentation of genocide and ethnic cleansing remains the essential legal argument for the legitimacy of Kosovo’s statehood as an inalienable right to survival.

Criticism of this judgment does not stem from any anti-American sentiment or rejection of the Euro-Atlantic orientation, much less from forgetting the historical fact that NATO’s 1999 intervention saved the people of Kosovo from physical annihilation. On the contrary, this criticism is the truest defense of Western values themselves. Justice administered in the name of the free world cannot operate with distorted standards of selectivity, sacrificing proportionality, equality of arms, and due process. Alliance does not require blind submission, partnership is not measured by provincial conformity, and profound historical gratitude to our liberators never means surrendering critical judgment or remaining silent in the face of a cynical geopolitical compromise.

Above all, in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, Kosovo must not knock on the doors of the European Union and NATO as a beggar pleading for geopolitical mercy. Its accelerated admission to Western structures is not charity; it is a long-overdue moral and political recompense for the indifference, hesitation, and, at times, direct participation of the Great Powers in the historical tragedy of the Albanian people. From the Congress of Berlin in 1878 and the Conference of London in 1913 (when Albanian lands were partitioned to satisfy the appetites of Greek and Slavic monarchies) to the imposition of the absurd arms embargo in the 1990s and the prolonged toleration of Milošević’s regime, Kosovo’s fate was gravely compromised by cynical European bargains. EU integration and protection under NATO’s umbrella are an indispensable act of restorative justice for this historical debt the West owes this people, but this claim cannot be diplomatically cashed in without a rigorous archive that transforms memory from folkloric lament into a geostrategic argument.

Now that the blow has fallen, we must necessarily learn from the experience. The judgment is only a first-instance ruling; defeat becomes irreversible only if we surrender to fatalism or erupt into folkloric despair. The example of how a mature state responds to such a legal catastrophe is clearly written in Croatia’s history. When, on April 15, 2011, the Hague Tribunal sentenced General Ante Gotovina to 24 years in prison and Mladen Markač to 18 years for a joint criminal enterprise during Operation “Storm,” the entire Croatian nation was plunged into deep moral shock. But Croatia did not retreat into mourning, nor did it begin to swallow the stigmatization of its liberation war. On the contrary, that drastic sentence served as the ultimate alarm, setting the country’s entire state, scientific, and diplomatic machinery in motion.

Between April 2011 and November 2012, the Croatian government, through the Memorial and Documentation Center of the Homeland War, the academy, and security institutions, did not exert political pressure on the court, but built a major scientific and legal counteroffensive for the second instance. Zagreb hired the sharpest international lawyers, mobilized the world’s leading artillery and ballistics experts to analyze every shell that landed in Knin, and presented incontrovertible documentary evidence proving that the trial chamber’s “200-meter margin of error” standard was a military absurdity. On November 16, 2012, the ICTY Appeals Chamber overturned the first-instance judgment on its merits, acquitted both generals, and permanently erased the label of joint criminal enterprise from Croatian freedom. That triumph did not come from patriotic slogans in the squares, but because a serious state turned the experience of the first-instance defeat into an organized strategic lesson.

Kosovo and Albania must immediately follow this path and this model today. The appeal in The Hague cannot be left solely to the defense lawyers and the convicted men’s families. The governments in Pristina and Tirana, universities, the Academy of Sciences, and the diaspora must abandon all factional disputes and establish an Intergovernmental Legal and Scientific Task Force within weeks. Archives must be opened, the most prominent international law experts engaged, the artificial claim of a rigid KLA military command with territorial control deconstructed, and the incontrovertible evidence of a guerrilla movement of survival presented to the Appeals Chamber. The conviction is a serious blow, but the victory of 1999 cannot be undone by an administrative decision. If we want this defeat not to become a permanent historical stigma on Kosovo’s freedom, our greatest institutional mobilization must begin today; the time for empty words and folkloristic gestures is over—now the Albanian states must speak in the language of science, diplomacy, law, and national dignity.

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