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What Did We Do to Lose the West: Belgrade’s Rehabilitation and Pristina’s Self-Isolation

What Did We Do to Lose the West: Belgrade’s Rehabilitation and Pristina’s Self-Isolation

Just a few days ago in New York, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the United States aims to deepen its strategic partnership with Serbia and that the Trump administration has already taken steps to bring the two countries closer. Rubio even expressed a desire to visit Belgrade. The statement cannot be considered a one-off diplomatic courtesy because, two months earlier, Washington and Belgrade had officially launched their first Strategic Dialogue, institutionalizing a rapprochement that had been in preparation for years.

Just a few days ago in New York, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that the United States aims to deepen its strategic partnership with Serbia and that the Trump administration has already taken steps to bring the two countries closer. Rubio even expressed a desire to visit Belgrade. The statement cannot be considered a one-off diplomatic courtesy because, two months earlier, Washington and Belgrade had officially launched their first Strategic Dialogue, institutionalizing a rapprochement that had been in preparation for years.

The timing of Rubio’s remarks about this rapprochement makes the picture even more alarming for us. Just a few weeks ago, Ratko Mladić, sentenced to life imprisonment for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, was given a state-honored send-off in Belgrade. The body of the architect of the most tragic massacre in postwar Europe was returned from The Hague on a Serbian government aircraft, his coffin was draped in the national flag, and institutional representatives attended the farewell ceremonies. The European Union and the United States formally condemned the glorification, but this did not produce any visible change in Serbia’s relations with the West.

At the same time, the main political leaders of the KLA have received draconian sentences, causing extraordinary shock throughout the Albanian world, but the international reverberations of the verdict remained surprisingly limited. Beyond news coverage and a few official statements that mainly reiterated support for the judicial process, there was no major international debate about the absurd length of pretrial detention, the collective and abusive nature of the judgment, the countless procedural violations, its bias and lack of standards, or the consequences the verdict could have for the historical interpretation of the Kosovo war and Western involvement in it. The reactions of Britain, France, and Germany, for example, focused mainly on respecting the court’s independence, individual responsibility, and the fact that the judgment was not a ruling against the KLA or Kosovo’s statehood.

Twenty-seven years after NATO’s intervention, Kosovo faces the challenge of defending its living heroes while once again explaining the character of its war of liberation to the world, at a time when Serbia has managed to repair and rebuild a considerable part of its standing in the West. The Strategic Dialogue that the United States had planned with Kosovo has been suspended, marking a tangible deterioration in a relationship that for decades was Kosovo’s most important strategic asset. The situation in Europe is just as worrying. Kosovo applied in December 2022, but almost four years later it still has not even received candidate-country status, while its neighbors have been in negotiations for a long time. We are therefore facing a painful paradox: Serbia is returning to the center of Western strategic calculations with considerable weight, while Kosovo is slipping toward their periphery. To be clear, Kosovo has not completely lost the West, since NATO’s presence and the major powers’ unwavering recognition of its sovereignty demonstrate this. But it has lost something just as critical: the strategic priority and unconditional sympathy it once enjoyed.

The current geopolitical signal is unmistakable: while Belgrade normalizes its criminal past and expands its diplomatic room for maneuver with the West, Pristina remains stuck in a defensive position, trying to re-establish the historical legitimacy of its own war of liberation. This is precisely where the question that should concern us begins: how did the most successful project of Western liberal intervention end up in a functionally frozen, transactional, and often openly dysfunctional relationship with its existential allies? What happened over these years to the political, moral, and diplomatic capital that Albanians had in Washington and in the major European capitals?

This asymmetry cannot be explained by the oversimplified idea of Western betrayal or by the fluctuations of a particular administration in the White House; it calls for a cool political autopsy. The easiest and most naive answer would be to attribute this shift exclusively to the Trump administration, changing American priorities, or the increasingly pragmatic nature of Western foreign policy. These factors matter, but we must acknowledge that the process began much earlier. Indeed, even during the Biden administration, Washington had begun discussing elevating relations with Belgrade to the level of a strategic dialogue. Serbia’s rapprochement with the United States, Belgrade’s return as an important partner for European capitals, and the gradual depletion of Kosovo’s diplomatic credibility are processes spanning several U.S. administrations and several governments in Pristina.

For precisely this reason, before asking what the West has changed toward us, we must have the courage to ask what we have changed in our relationship with the West. This requires honest and courageous self-reflection, not to distribute blame or justify injustices, but to understand mistakes, draw lessons, and, above all, make the necessary changes to strengthen the international standing of Kosovo and the Albanian nation. The extraordinary political, moral, and diplomatic capital Kosovo had in the West was not spent overnight. It was eroded through a series of unnecessary crises, uncoordinated decisions, and conflicts with partners which, taken individually, might have seemed manageable, but together damaged their trust in and respect for Kosovo.

The tensions, confrontations, and mistakes that have contributed to this erosion are numerous and worth mentioning, not to compile an inventory of blame, but because they show that the loss of diplomatic capital did not happen by chance overnight. Before seeking a remedy for Kosovo’s relationship with the West, we must make a diagnosis; and every serious diagnosis begins with a history of what went wrong.

One of the first serious blows to Kosovo’s image came with the spread of violent religious extremism and the departure of hundreds of citizens for Syria and Iraq. The phenomenon began to become visible around 2012 and peaked during 2013–14, when Kosovo ranked among the countries with the highest number of foreign fighters per capita. For a small state that had built a significant part of its international capital on a strong pro-American and pro-Western orientation, this was not only a security problem, but also a reputational one. Kosovo later responded with legislation, police operations, international cooperation, and rehabilitation and reintegration programs, managing to curb the phenomenon significantly, but the initial damage to its image had already been done.

Likewise, the prolonged demarcation process with Montenegro, accompanied by tear gas, violence, and polarization, raised doubts about Kosovo’s ability to honor agreements and contribute to regional stability at a time when Russia was conspiring against Podgorica’s accession to NATO. Similarly, the unclear and hesitant response of Kosovo’s institutions to the grave events in Kumanovo raised unnecessary questions among Western partners. Although Kosovo was not a party to the conflict, the involvement of some of its citizens in the armed group weakened Kosovo’s image as an unquestionable factor for regional stability. This was particularly important at that moment because Washington and its European allies were trying to bring Macedonia into NATO, while a new interethnic conflict could destabilize the country and block this process altogether.

Another problem that began early and recurred over the years was the gap between agreements accepted in the dialogue and their implementation. The signing of the 2013 and 2015 agreements (as continued with the 2023 Ohrid Agreement), followed by opposition to or delays in implementing them, particularly regarding the Association, without always proposing convincing alternatives within the constitutional framework, began to damage the perception of Kosovo as a reliable contractual partner. Later, the 100% tariff on Serbian goods, despite its sovereignist rationale and Belgrade’s campaign against Kosovo, was imposed without coordinating with allies, blocked the dialogue, and had consequences for financial support and security cooperation with the Americans. Here too, a real problem Kosovo had with Serbia ended up creating a parallel problem in Kosovo’s relations with the United States.

Confrontations with partners returned forcefully over the north from 2022, first around license plates and then, in the spring of 2023, following elections boycotted by Serbs and the installation of new mayors in municipal buildings. It was here that the clash with allies took on a new dimension, with Washington and Brussels calling for de-escalation and coordination. However, Pristina’s continued actions against their advice shifted some of the international pressure onto Kosovo and led to EU sanctions in June 2023. Clashes continued afterward over how the regulation on the dinar was implemented, the closure of Serbian parallel structures, and other actions in the north. Even when the aim—extending sovereignty and enforcing constitutional order—was legitimate, the unilateral approach and lack of coordination with allies incurred an unnecessary diplomatic cost, giving Belgrade the opportunity, despite the serious attack in Banjska and other destabilizing actions, to continually shift international attention from Serbia’s conduct to Kosovo’s clashes with its partners.

We must also add the open criticism, media vilification, and crude name-calling directed at Western envoys (Blinken, Lajčák, Borrell, American envoys, and other European foreign ministries), which were not displays of sovereignty, but acts of immaturity that directly harmed Kosovo by breaking the fundamental rules of diplomacy. Instead of addressing grievances professionally through closed channels, Kosovo’s leadership chose populist spectacle and public confrontation, achieving the most absurd result possible. These attacks did not change their policies, but made relations with the people and institutions from whom Kosovo sought support more difficult. In diplomacy, especially for a small state, influence depends not only on the merits of an argument, but also on trust, access, and the ability to cultivate allies within foreign administrations. And the diplomatic consequence here was particularly self-destructive, because although Kosovo had very strong arguments against Serbia, it squandered this advantage by simultaneously opening conflicts with Western mediators. In this way, it shifted international attention from Serbia’s aggression to Kosovo’s conduct and helped Belgrade present itself as the more restrained and constructive party.

Above all, the problem was not only how Kosovo managed its relationship with its allies, but also how little it managed to deepen its ties with the West through its own internal transformation. Reforms in the rule of law, the fight against corruption, the strengthening of institutions, the building of a functioning market economy, and the protection of human and minority rights did not progress with the intensity required by the country’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions. These are not merely bureaucratic demands from Brussels, but fundamental parts of the Copenhagen criteria and a source of political power for a state seeking to become part of the West. Kosovo should not only have sought the protection of this community, but become an organic part of it; it should have behaved like a country no longer knocking at the West’s door, but building the same political model within itself. The less a country embodies Western standards, the easier it becomes for Western bureaucracies to treat it as a peripheral problem and a bargaining chip. It is therefore not enough for Kosovo to consider itself part of the West; it had to make the West consider Kosovo part of itself.

Underlying many of these critical mistakes was also the belief that the capital accumulated in 1999 was virtually inexhaustible and that the West owed Kosovo permanent and unconditional support. But alliances are not maintained on historical memory alone; they must be continually renewed through geostrategic relevance, proactive diplomacy, professional lobbying, credible institutions, and predictable conduct toward partners. We squandered part of our standing and credibility precisely by doing the opposite: creating unnecessary crises with allies, making uncoordinated decisions, leaving agreements unimplemented, engaging in public confrontations with partners, and failing to complete domestic reforms. Over the years, these things eroded trust and the willingness to support Kosovo unreservedly. Serbia will continue to pursue its interests, Western powers will change their priorities, and the international order will become increasingly less sentimental. The answer cannot be to complain that the West has changed, but to understand how influence works and make Kosovo important once again to its allies’ interests, security, and values.

History gave us an extraordinary position; politics must preserve it, renew it, and multiply it. At the same time, Pristina completely underestimated the battle of international narratives. While Belgrade invested tens of millions of euros in lobbying networks, academic institutes, foreign publications, and archives to relativize its guilt in the 1990s, Kosovo’s institutions failed to establish even a single research institute with international standing to document war crimes. The state did not build legal and scholarly infrastructure to defend the narrative of the war of liberation, leaving a factual vacuum that was easily filled by Belgrade’s fabrications and the judicial proceedings of international mechanisms.

Another of our misunderstandings has been that we have often treated Kosovo’s foreign policy as an extension of domestic political conflict. The diplomatic service was often used as an instrument of partisan patronage, rather than building a permanent corps of diplomats and analysts capable of negotiating with the major centers of Western decision-making. We have used our relationship with the United States and the West as electoral capital; that is, when relations have been good, the government of the day has presented them as its own achievement; when they have deteriorated, the opposition has used them as proof of the government’s failure, creating the illusion that every political turnover would also bring a fresh start in international relations. But our partners do not see Kosovo through the lens of our electoral cycles. They see the state and the continuity of its inappropriate conduct: agreements that remain problematic, reforms that are delayed, crises that recur, and coordination difficulties that return regardless of who is in government. In Pristina, we divide mistakes by parties and terms in office, but our partners record them as Kosovo’s mistakes. In Pristina, governments, culprits, and excuses change; in Western capitals, Kosovo’s file continues from where it was left. Therefore, the relationship with the West cannot be the electoral capital of any party, but a state and national interest that requires consensus, discipline, and continuity beyond every change of government.

This self-reflective accounting does not justify injustices, double standards, or a judicial process in The Hague that raises serious questions, nor does it shift responsibility away from those who may have violated legal standards in order to tarnish our war of liberation. But victimhood corrects no injustice and, above all, produces no diplomatic power. A serious state must understand not only who has wronged it, but also how credibility works, how alliances are built, and how to make itself important to others. While Belgrade and Banja Luka spend millions on lobbying and influence in Washington, Kosovo has today disappeared from FARA’s records, precisely where one can measure who is investing to be heard. For Kosovo, this is an existential issue, because we have no strategic Plan B: our security, development, and political future are tied to the Euro-Atlantic world. The challenge, therefore, is not to wait for the West to support us forever for what happened in 1999, but to make Kosovo important for what will happen tomorrow.

This requires a strategy far more concrete than superficial pro-Western rhetoric. Kosovo must rebuild its presence in Washington, Brussels, London, Berlin, and Paris through professional diplomacy, sustained lobbying, and networks with Congress, parliaments, administrations, political parties, universities, research institutes, and the media; use the diaspora as a source of influence and not merely as a source of remittances and votes; invest in archives, research, and public diplomacy so that Kosovo’s history is not defended only when it is called into question; coordinate with allies before crises, not after they erupt; and complete the reforms that make Kosovo credible according to the standards of the community it seeks to join. Above all, it must find ways to contribute to today’s Western agenda: regional security, defense, energy, technology, and resistance to authoritarian influence. A small country cannot impose its importance, but it must build it.

In the end, the lesson must be greater than an accounting of individual mistakes; it must be a call for awareness and mobilization for an institutional response from official Pristina, in close cooperation with Tirana. The erosion of credibility with allies, the lack of domestic reform, the failure to renew strategic relevance, and the loss of the battle of narratives show that the relationship with the West can no longer be left at the mercy of political improvisation and electoral cycles. Kosovo needs a new national consensus that treats the alliance with the West as a permanent strategic interest of the state, beyond parties, governments, and terms in office. History gave us a privileged position in the West; the challenge for our generation is to create the political, strategic, and moral reasons for the West to continue investing in Kosovo tomorrow as well.

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