There has been a reaction against the authorities in Serbia from European countries, including the European Union, over the burial of Ratko Mladić, convicted, among other things, of genocide in Srebrenica by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, with state and military honors. What is clearly apparent is the surprise of Europeans and various Western intellectual and political figures at this approach by official Belgrade, considering it the glorification of a war criminal and an attempt to rewrite history.
Mlladić’s Treatment in Serbia: Great Irony, Yes, Surprise, No!

There has been a reaction against the authorities in Serbia from European countries, including the European Union, over the burial of Ratko Mladić, convicted, among other things, of genocide in Srebrenica by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, with state and military honors. What is clearly apparent is the surprise of Europeans and various Western intellectual and political figures at this approach by official Belgrade, considering it the glorification of a war criminal and an attempt to rewrite history.
Of course, this has a history that paved the way for this treatment of war criminals in Serbia and, more generally, for Serbia’s role in the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Although most of those indicted and tried by this tribunal were Serbs, and although Serbia was bombed by NATO in the spring of 1999 for the massacres it was committing in Kosovo, no regime in Belgrade, even after the changes of 2000, treated Milošević’s regime as primarily responsible for the wars and the suffering, especially of Bosniaks, Albanians and Croats, but also of Serbs themselves, during the breakup of Yugoslavia.
The Hague Tribunal, established in 1993, was the first international tribunal since the end of the Second World War. At Nuremberg, the Nazi leadership was not only convicted individually, but a number of organizations, such as the National Socialist Party, the Gestapo, the SS Corps, etc., were also declared criminal organizations and banned from operating. In Germany and Austria, processes of denazification subsequently took place, insofar as they did (the needs of the Cold War created circumstances in which this process was softened). Japanese wartime leaders were also convicted at the Tokyo Tribunal. In no case was there a judgment against the Allies, despite the fact that they too had been involved in a number of killings and the bombing of civilians, even going so far as to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Of course, the victors, who were also on the right side of history, put the losers, who had caused the Second World War with their policies, which were not only expansionist but also inhumane, on trial—criminally, politically and historically.
The development of international criminal law in the post-Second World War context moved toward strengthening the concept of individual responsibility within the military and political chain of command. But in the case of the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, things went too far, and the political message was sent (which was, of course, also a political compromise within the UN, including with Russia): although Serbia might be more guilty, everyone was guilty of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. As a result, reconciliation between ethnic groups, the punishment of war crimes and a degree of acknowledgment of guilt did not achieve the desired outcome. On the one hand, this message created discontent among Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians; on the other, Serbian politicians exploited it to the fullest to rehabilitate not only certain war criminals, but also to relativize Serbia’s own role in this process.
The culmination of the relativization of the weight of war crimes between the aggressor and those who fought for liberation and freedom and defended their country was international pressure—again, in a particular political context of relations with Russia—for Kosovo to establish the Specialist Chambers to deal with war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo. A court that pursues only one ethnic group, only Albanians and only members of the KLA, in a country where they were the victims, fought for freedom and faced a sophisticated state killing machine. A court established to prosecute Albanians for war crimes, at a time when we all know that justice in Kosovo for crimes committed by the Serbian occupier has not even remotely been served.

















