As we keep our eyes and ears on The Hague, awaiting the publication of the judgment on the four KLA members, one fundamental question is whether the SPO has proved beyond a reasonable doubt not only the existence of crimes, but also the existence of a common criminal purpose and the individual participation of each of the four accused in that purpose, as essential elements of a joint criminal enterprise.
The Specialist Prosecutor’s Office Failed to Prove the “Joint Criminal Enterprise” with Evidence

As we keep our eyes and ears on The Hague, awaiting the publication of the judgment on the four KLA members, one fundamental question is whether the SPO has proved beyond a reasonable doubt not only the existence of crimes, but also the existence of a common criminal purpose and the individual participation of each of the four accused in that purpose, as essential elements of a joint criminal enterprise.
First, it is essential and very important to clarify that the existence of crimes does not in itself prove the existence of a Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), and furthermore, even the existence of a JCE does not in itself prove the guilt of each individual; rather, all the links in the chain must be proved as a whole.
In essence, the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, which bore the burden of proof, should have argued beyond a reasonable doubt that the following elements existed:
1. Did a joint criminal enterprise exist?
2. Was there a common criminal purpose?
3. Did each of the four accused participate in that enterprise?
4. What was their contribution (significant or proven) to achieving that purpose?
5. Did the level of culpability required for the specific form of JCE exist?
It should be emphasized that the SPO itself, in its earlier submissions, had formulated the standard by stressing that it is important and necessary to prove that each accused made a significant contribution to the common criminal plan and its implementation, together with the existence of the requisite level of culpability.
It is essential and very important to establish that it is not enough to prove that Thaçi, Veseli, Selimi and Krasniqi were prominent figures in the KLA; it must be proved what the criminal purpose was and what each of them specifically did to achieve it—something that the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office has failed to do, as far as can be seen.
But what is a criminal purpose?
This is an extremely important point in this case. It is not enough to prove that crimes were committed, even if some of them were committed by or inflicted upon KLA members, or that the four accused held important positions, including the fact that they knew one another or had political or military communications. The existence of a specific common criminal purpose, to which the four accused had joined, would have to be proved.
Moreover, this is particularly important because the SPO’s own material emphasizes the existence of relations among the four KLA members and their long-standing ties, the establishment of the General Staff, political consultations, and the prestige they had among KLA commanders and soldiers. This might prove the existence of political/military cooperation, but in no way does it prove the existence of a common criminal purpose, since these are fundamentally different things.
Although the existence of the KLA, the General Staff, commanders, an operational structure, communications and possibly a hierarchy is uncontested (although communications and hierarchy have not been proven), one must go further, because the organizational structure must be linked to the common criminal purpose—a link that must be proved with concrete evidence, and this has not been done.
It is also important to know that each person’s individual responsibility must be analyzed separately. Therefore, even if it is established that a JCE existed, this does not automatically mean that everyone can be found guilty.
This is because, for each of the four KLA members, it must be established whether they were a member of the JCE, what its purpose was, what their contribution was, and what their culpability was.
Because a JCE may be joint, but criminal responsibility is individual, the Prosecution must prove whether there was a JCE, whether they were part of a criminal enterprise, the extent of their responsibility as superiors, and above all whether they had effective control over their subordinates, knew or had reason to know about any crimes, and failed to take the necessary measures. In circumstances where travel from one village to another, or from one area to another, was sometimes difficult and sometimes impossible, such actions were impossible to carry out.
Proof of a political/military structure or of a person’s authority is not equivalent to proof of a common criminal purpose.
The SPO has failed to prove with concrete evidence that any of the four KLA members had embraced the criminal purpose, much less what their specific criminal contribution to achieving that purpose was.
The SPO’s main focus may have rested primarily on position, reputation, contacts, authority, communications and political ties, but without a sufficient link to the criminal purpose. Therefore, there is a serious problem in moving from “leader” to “participant in a Joint Criminal Enterprise.”
The Prosecution has failed to prove these elements; therefore, expectations are well-founded and legitimate that the charges of Joint Criminal Enterprise will fall and, along with them, a verdict acquitting the four KLA members.

















