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The Terror Only Pupin Can See

The Terror Only Pupin Can See

KFOR has around 4,600 troops in Kosovo, and its commander said on August 25 that it is increasing its presence in North Mitrovica and the north. The OSCE considers Kosovo its largest field operation: 384 staff, teams in all 38 municipalities, and a mandate that includes community rights, security monitoring and early warning. EULEX monitors alleged cases of police misconduct and says it does so through a direct field presence. The United States Embassy has spent a quarter of a century building its contacts in Graçanicë and the north. Pupin identifies no warning from any of these structures that Kosovo Serbs are living in anything resembling the situation described in its report.

KFOR has around 4,600 troops in Kosovo, and its commander said on August 25 that it is increasing its presence in North Mitrovica and the north. The OSCE considers Kosovo its largest field operation: 384 staff, teams in all 38 municipalities, and a mandate that includes community rights, security monitoring and early warning. EULEX monitors alleged cases of police misconduct and says it does so through a direct field presence. The United States Embassy has spent a quarter of a century building its contacts in Graçanicë and the north. Pupin identifies no warning from any of these structures that Kosovo Serbs are living in anything resembling the situation described in its report.

A report written by three authors from the Pupin Initiative, published on September 10, now asks these missions to act as though such a situation exists. The report leaves them with a question: what have they all failed to see?

Pupin cannot be dismissed as just another nationalist organization in Belgrade. It is precisely the kind of Serbian organization Washington is inclined to listen to. Its American arm is a 501(c)(3) organization. Christopher Hill, a five-time U.S. ambassador and most recently ambassador to Serbia, is a senior adviser and needs no introduction on the subject of Kosovo. A vice president of BGR Group advises it. Its other documents argue in favor of the Three Seas Initiative and against Serbia’s membership in WAICO. This report will reach desks where ordinary Belgrade lobbying cannot.

The report never uses the word terror. It does something more effective: it constructs the conditions of terror. A frightened population. A police force experienced as a threat rather than as protection. Collective blame. Reporting that has collapsed. Institutions unable to detect abuse. Churches that may be at risk. And international missions that misinterpret all of this. Then the report also makes a demand. Before the Specialist Chambers issue their decision on September 16, it calls for the already-initiated transition on the bridge over the Ibar to be frozen for a “high-risk period,” without specifying an end date. An unmeasurable situation must produce a measurable outcome.

The facts on which it relies are true. Thirty-seven people were detained at Gazimestan, fined 700 euros, and some were deported. The Police Inspectorate recommended suspending two officers in connection with the Nenad Rashković case in Dren. On August 27, the Judicial Council refused to allow Serbian judges to withdraw their 2022 resignations, which the German Embassy later asked Pristina to rectify. None of this is terror. That is why the report places terror where it has not been verified.

Pupin’s argument is that the decline in reports of incidents indicates an increase in fear, because Serbs no longer report to a police force they do not trust. The report says this can be tested and even specifies how: community surveys, underreporting rates and case outcomes. But it conducts none of these tests. Its methodology lists three pieces of evidence, one of which is anonymous. Pupin publishes the conclusion first. Then it asks the missions that could actually measure this situation to act on it. The abbot of Deçan supplies the rest: every arrest and every search “can be explained separately,” but their “sum” makes life unpredictable. That sum is never calculated.

Section 9.1 then predicts attacks on Serbs and sacred sites around September 16, on three grounds: either of the two possible decisions could mobilize people, the bridge regime is changing, and the media atmosphere is tense. There is no series of incidents, no threat reports, no comparisons with previous decisions, and no warning from any field mission linking these circumstances to violence. On this evidentiary basis, Pupin asks KFOR and diplomatic missions to stop implementing a security transition that has already been put in place.

The vocabulary is familiar. “Protection from the police.” “Collective blame attributed to Serbs.” A president speaking of “survival” in connection with a bridge. Vučić spoke of “terrible terror” against Kosovo Serbs in Rmanj on August 2. Here it is presented in the English of verification, on Washington letterhead.

Pupin says the missions are looking at the wrong indicator: Serbs no longer report to the police. But the report itself lists the channels that are working. The Ombudsperson opened the Gazimestan case following complaints from citizens. The Inspectorate opened the case in Dren on its own initiative. Five lawyers arrived through the Belgrade Office for Kosovo. Serbian television broadcast footage of Rashković’s injuries within a day. A community with so many functioning channels is simply avoiding one address. The missions have never relied on that address for their information to know what is happening in Zubin Potok.

The missions therefore face a double alternative that the report will not state clearly, because they are precisely the people being asked to act. Either Kosovo is experiencing a human rights crisis and the international presence has failed spectacularly to notice itI am writing this from Tirana. Pupin operates from Belgrade and Washington. Kosovo is not one of its addresses. The difference is that I do not claim to see what those who are there cannot see, or an imaginary situation is being used to secure a real outcome on the bridge over the Ibar.

I am writing this from Tirana. Pupin operates from Belgrade and Washington. Kosovo is not one of its addresses. The difference is that I do not claim to see what those who are there cannot see. Pupin does. It has constructed a state of terror that only it claims to be able to perceive and, two days before a court decision, has handed it over to KFOR, EULEX, the OSCE and the diplomats who are actually on the ground. For them, this must be the most troubling claim in the entire report.

Ardit Rada is a journalist based in Tirana who covers politics, governance and institutional developments. His focus is the intersection between domestic political dynamics and Albania’s European path.

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