We have known Dr. Daut Dauti since he began writing for Pristina magazines and newspapers, when he was already showing promise of a successful career in journalism. In the early 1990s, we also encountered him in Albanian publicistic writing. His articles dealt in particular with historical subjects rooted in documents from the British Archives, […]
The Creation of Albania in London as a Result of a Compromise Among the Great Powers

We have known Dr. Daut Dauti since he began writing for Pristina magazines and newspapers, when he was already showing promise of a successful career in journalism. In the early 1990s, we also encountered him in Albanian publicistic writing. His articles dealt in particular with historical subjects rooted in documents from the British Archives, through which, in one way or another, he imposed himself on the Albanian public everywhere, not only with an approach that demystified historical truths, but also by “opposing” the Albanian (official) historiography that had been produced up to that point and had been under the strict control of the state. Dr. Dauti graduated from the Faculty of Law at the University of Pristina, earned a master’s degree in London in European Union Law, and received his doctorate in history at the University of Leeds in England, in an exceptionally interesting field that encompasses the period from the Albanian League of Prizren to the London Conference. Dr. Daut Dauti’s studies are a brilliant contribution to shedding light on periods about which very little has been written here, and sometimes writing has come very close to the subject—a point also emphasized in his assessments of Dauti by the distinguished British historian Noel Malcolm. Thus, in this lengthy interview conducted especially for “Akademia” magazine, we will discuss with him some of the issues that characterized the period studied by this researcher, including certain matters encountered for the first time in our publicistic writing and historiography. Dr. Daut Dauti has published a host of publicistic and scholarly books that make him one of the most distinctive voices in contemporary Albanian historiography. Interviewed by: Haqif Mulliqi
Mr. Dauti, you are an experienced journalist, writer, lawyer, and so on. A question anyone might ask you is this: how did such a strong, almost passionate, interest in historiography come about?
I believe it was initially a journalist’s curiosity that prompted me to go to the British Archives, or the PRO (Public Record Office). I wanted to know what British diplomats had written about us Albanians, especially during and after the Second World War. I was interested in their position because we knew very little about Albanian-British relations, which were not particularly close or extensive and were completely severed after the Second World War. There was very little material on this subject, either in Albanian or in English. My first contact with documents in this archive had a tremendous impact. Before me were documents that had once been secret, describing important situations and personalities, which I was reading half a century later. I began this work as a journalist, starting with one topic, but continued as a writer, and later it became almost my primary interest. My interest grew because the documents I found were voluminous and covered numerous situations and different periods. This interest continued for decades and culminated in my doctoral research at the University of Leeds, which is my largest historiographical project. But in reality, my interest has not ended there, since it continues to spur me to open more files covered in dust, which speak about Albanians and their history. I still visit this archive, as well as several others, because there is always something there to pique one’s curiosity—to uncover things we do not know or shed light on things we do not know sufficiently or as well as we should.
I think quite a few people remember some of the fascinating serial articles you published in the first half of 1991 and continued for many years: Albanians in the Intelligence Services’ documents, the one on the Albanian-British Corfu Conflict, the serial on Kim Philby and the CIA and MI6’s attempts to overthrow the communist regime in Albania during 1949–1952, and so on. What made this kind of documentation of Albanian historiography distinctive, especially after nearly five decades in which political and ideological thinking had dominated this science?
Most of these documents, with great enthusiasm, we prepared together—you and I—for publication in newspapers. It was the first time that documents from British archives were being published in Albanian publicistic writing. They had previously been (top) secret, compiled by diplomats and consuls who had served in the Balkan region. These reports were initially intended to inform a small number of senior British officials who had to make decisions on these matters. So, seeing and reading something official that was once very important is a task that deepens one’s desire to investigate further. Then, the opportunity to circulate it for a wide readership creates a sense of satisfaction. Informing the public for the first time about the contents of documents concerning the Corfu Question, Kim Philby, the Anglo-American plan to overthrow the communist regime in Albania, and other topics was work that I still consider very important today.
Can the science of historiography develop under state control?
History is a science, and science does not tolerate “regulation” or any kind of state interference. Intervention means setting rules for research and publication. Scientists, including historians, would not create an accurate or clear picture if they were restricted in their choice of topics, methods of research, or interpretation. Historians are obliged to study a topic and present the facts or final findings regardless of how they are reflected in the existing state of society. State interference has been a problem in the countries of Eastern Europe, especially in the former communist bloc, as we still call a certain geographical area that includes the Balkans. During communism, states shaped history in a way that suited the political system and communist rule. In the Balkans, in addition to the problem of communism, there have also been territorial claims, as there are today, and for this reason history has been burdened with a considerable dose of nationalism. Here, the state demanded that historians serve it. But there are many cases in which historians themselves have provided, and continue to provide, service within the lines previously set by the state. During communism, historical events were redesigned and personalities and heroes constructed in such a way as to serve the political system. If an explanation differed from the one that had been prescribed, state intervention followed, with punishment. We have had quite a few such cases in Albania, but also in Kosovo when this country was part of Yugoslavia’s territorial and political system. For example, Yugoslav history stated that Kosovo had voluntarily joined the Yugoslav state and that after 1945 it had progressed and was equal to all the peoples of that state.
Therefore, in the Balkans, it is not uncommon for three or four countries’ histories to claim an event or a personality, usually a hero, as their own. Today, Albanian historiography also faces this problem. During communism, the line for studying and interpreting events and personalities was prescribed. Today, historians who depart from this line are no longer punished. But some still think these historians cause “problems” because they challenge the “traditional” line.
In one of your recent articles that we happened to read, you write about the division of the Albanian border to Albania’s detriment. Kosovo was left outside, as was the western part of what was called “southern Serbia” (later Macedonia), but the borders of “London Albania” continued to be contested after the First World War: the border between the villages of Korçë and Greece, the Vermosh issue with Montenegro, and the issue of Saint Naum, then with Serbia. Why do you think this happened?
Albania is a state created as the result of a compromise among the Great Powers reached in London in 1913. In reality, the vast majority of states created, especially since the 19th century, have been the result of international compromises. But in Albania’s case, the compromise was excessive, utterly unreasonable and, as such, painful for Albanians.
Among the Albanian public at large and some of our historians, Great Britain is viewed unfavorably. In their view, London is to blame for Albania being cut in half. In reality, the opposite is true, and things could have been even worse if the British had sided with the Russians and French, who did not favor the creation of an independent Albania. The British Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, declared that his country was neutral on the issue and that London was merely offering good offices. In reality, Grey supported the formation of the Albanian state. The formation of the Albanian state meant the end of Russian and Serbian dreams of access to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Britain’s interest was to keep Russia as far away from these seas as possible. A few days before the start of the London Conference, the Greek and Serbian foreign ministers met with Edward Grey, and both asked him the same question: what would Britain’s position be at the Conference? Grey replied to both of them: Albania would be formed as an autonomous state. Nevertheless, the British were not concerned with the ethnic distribution of Albanians. Their interest was to prevent Russian penetration into the Balkans and the Adriatic. That was the compromise in Britain’s interest.
The compromise on Albania largely excluded the ethnic criterion. Since this exclusion left half the territory and population outside the borders, Albanians never accepted it. Wars are moments when borders change, and Albanians acted in such circumstances in the hope of setting the borders according to their own measure, or applying the ethnic criterion.
After the London Conference, the Great Powers showed no interest in Albania, despite the agreement they had reached to help the state establish itself and stand on its own feet as an independent country. The Great Powers did not honor the obligations they had undertaken in London. This unfavorable situation for Albania continued after the First World War as well. The powers’ neglect was a sign that Albania had been left undefended. This was why neighboring states continued to contest their borders with Albania and tried to seize as much territory as possible.
Since the issue of northern Kosovo and Mitrovica are “hot” national and international topics, I suggest we pause here, particularly to discuss the main economic asset not only of the Balkans, “Trepça”! To be honest, at this point I would not hesitate to say that one of the best studies on Trepça I have come across is in your book, “The Battle for Trepça,” and today this same “battle” continues to be the hottest point in the final resolution of issues in the region.
To a large extent, “Trepça” today determines the difficult situation between Kosovo and Serbia and the division of the city of Mitrovica. Mitrovica, because of the railway built in 1873, was a strategic point. Austro-Hungary’s expansionist aspirations to reach Thessaloniki were linked to Mitrovica. But Mitrovica became even more important in 1927, when the British obtained the concessions to exploit “Trepça”—that is, when the mine was revived, and with it Mitrovica and the entire region. The British were the ones who increased the region’s value and strategic importance. In Stan Tërg, the British built a center that included a complex of modern residences, a swimming pool, tennis courts, and facilities for extracting and processing the ore mined at “Trepça.” This was the beginning of the 20th century, and in the Balkans such things were found only in Mitrovica, where the spread of an English culture was beginning. Archival records indicate that the British respected Albanians, whom they considered diligent and competent miners. On the other hand, the Albanians also respected the British—the owners of Trepça—because they had revived life in the region.
Unfortunately, the British presence in Kosovo ended in 1941 when the Germans, after invading, also occupied “Trepça.” That was how long British interests were present in Kosovo—an interest that was the first and most important not only in former Yugoslavia, but also in the Balkans. In 1946, “Trepça” was nationalized by the Yugoslav communist regime, and this act terminated the 50-year contract for British concessions in Trepça. The Germans and Yugoslavs exploited “Trepça” only after British investment had made this possible. Nevertheless, the compensation to the British was inadequate.
Even today, Serbs “forget” the monasteries and other cultural and religious heritage sites they have appropriated, and would give them all up for “Trepça,” or even just a share of it. What does this mean to you as a historian and political scientist?
Belgrade is not interested in monasteries, or the religious or human rights of Serbs in Kosovo. Belgrade’s interest is Kosovo’s territory. Serbian policy has shown that it wants to connect Serbia territorially to the northern part of Kosovo, where Leposavić is located, and as far as Mitrovica, so that the industrial complex called “Trepça” would be included there.
Since “Trepça” remains one of the important factors in relations between Serbia and Kosovo, it would not be a bad idea to consider giving the British priority during privatization. This would entirely defuse any potential external claim to “Trepça,” while Belgrade’s door to territorial claims against Kosovo would be closed.
One of the most interesting studies I have come across, undoubtedly, not only among your works, is “The Albanian Question in British Diplomacy, 1877–1880.” As the title indicates, your book is based on documents from the archives of the Foreign Office, the British Parliament, the British Library, and the private correspondence of several British officials who, in various official capacities, were involved in the Albanian question during the period covered by this book. Why did you choose to study precisely this historical period for the Albanians?
The period 1877–1880 represents the major changes in the Balkans and within the Ottoman Empire that followed the Russo-Turkish wars. These changes also affected the Albanians, who until then had shown sporadic national tendencies. With the League of Prizren, Albanians appeared with a national program that included a demand for the establishment of an autonomous state. This is the period of major events for Albanians, initiated by the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The British therefore showed great interest in recording these moments, which is why the main and most numerous sources can be found today in their various archives. This is also why I was interested in this topic.
The book presents the important events that took place during the aforementioned years in the four Albanian vilayets, which directly or indirectly influenced the emergence of Albanian nationalism. I think one exceptionally interesting finding in your study is that, unlike in the earlier studies we have read, it becomes clear that not all of the Great Powers of that time were always against the Albanians and their cause. For example, you conclude that there were moments when important diplomats, especially British ones, favored the creation of a nucleus of an Albanian state, even if it was within the Ottoman Empire—a goal of the Albanian leadership of the time as well, was it not?
Since the Congress of Berlin, there has been a current in British policy—in Parliament, the government, and diplomacy—that favored the establishment of an Albanian state. This is an important fact that our historians ignored until recently. A large number of supporters of the Albanians operated within the Conservative Party led by Benjamin Disraeli (1804–1881), who served two terms as prime minister of Great Britain, from 1874 to 1880. This was why the leaders of the League of Prizren submitted their memorandum only to Disraeli, asking him to defend the Albanian cause in Berlin. The British did not take the Albanians under their protection, but neither did they oppose them, as all the other participating states did. Indeed, Disraeli went down in history as a man who had no respect at all for the peoples of the Balkans, except the Albanians.
Russia’s position toward the Albanians in Berlin is well known. At this stage, Austro-Hungary and Italy viewed Albanian territory as a place that would fall under their rule if the Ottomans withdrew. Germany supported Austro-Hungary. France supported Greece and Serbia. Great Britain had initiated the Congress and went to Berlin to defend its own interests: peace in the Adriatic and Mediterranean, where its route to India lay. Russia’s access to these seas would have meant the end of the Ottoman Empire. The existence of the Ottoman Empire was in Britain’s interest. The creation of an Albanian state also meant the end of Ottoman rule in Europe, and no one, including Britain, was prepared to upset Istanbul over this. The British not only had no interest in the uncontrolled fall of the Ottoman Empire, they also faced no domestic public pressure to create an Albanian state. Therefore, the Albanian question was silenced by the British in Berlin because they saw no reason to act on it.
Everyone came out a winner in Berlin, except the Albanians and the Ottomans. The Austro-Hungarians took over the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and extended their reach toward Albania. The Russians, aided by France, made Montenegro and Serbia independent and secured autonomy for Bulgaria. The British took Cyprus and finally brought the Mediterranean and the route to India under their control. According to this strategy, the Albanians could wait. All the powers had territorial claims or ambitions to conquer Albanian territory. Great Britain was the only one without such ambitions anywhere in the Balkans, which made London the perfect protector. In the eyes of the Albanians, an Albania comprising four vilayets would be born and develop in the British incubator. This was why the Albanians sought friendship with the British and never stopped trying to find ways to influence London’s policy.
In your studies you have documented that for a long time the British government opposed Greek ambitions, supported by France, to take Ioannina and a large region of Epirus, which was populated mainly by Albanians.
During the Congress in Berlin, and afterward, the French prime minister Waddington, an Englishman naturalized as a Frenchman, emerged as Greece’s chief defender. He constantly pressured Disraeli to accept a vast expansion of Greece that would have reached almost as far as what is today known as central Albania. Waddington stopped only when Disraeli instructed his ambassador in Paris that he no longer wished to hear about Greece’s expansion toward Ioannina. Disraeli had visited Albania in 1830, where he had spent pleasant moments with Albanians and become familiar with the Greek and Albanian questions. Disraeli was the only prime minister in Berlin who took care to distinguish between Albanians and Greeks. He called Ioannina the capital of southern Albania and had no intention of handing it over to Greece. On this issue, Disraeli also wrote to Bismarck in 1879 and received his approval. On this occasion, Bismarck too acknowledged that the Albanian question was proving much more problematic than had been thought in Berlin. Thus, Ioannina and its surrounding area as far as Arta remained in Albania because of Disraeli.
You also conclude in your study that British and Austro-Hungarian friendship did not go far in defending the legitimate rights of the Albanians, despite all the interest—or at least, as in the case of the friendship these two empires, especially the other European states, developed and strengthened with Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro. Is this borne out by the fact that these three states were, in effect, “sponsored” by Russia, which had grown much stronger in relation to the Ottoman Empire, especially after Moscow lost the Crimean War?
Apart from Great Britain, all the other powers viewed Albania as their future dominion. Russia’s power was on the rise, and it was not easy to oppose in Berlin. British foreign policy, especially that led by the Conservatives, was built around opposing Russia’s expansion toward the Balkans, the regions of British colonies in Asia, and Istanbul. This was why there was a powerful alliance between the British and Ottoman Empires. It was also why Great Britain and France, together with Sardinia, came to the aid of the Ottoman Empire in its war against Russia, which had begun to expand. This war, known as the Crimean War (1853–1856), was bloody and brought major changes that were also reflected in the Balkans. Russia lost the war, but gained the right to interfere in the Balkans because it was recognized as the protector of the rights of the Orthodox population under Ottoman rule. By exercising this right, Russia treated national problems as religious ones and managed to spread the idea of Pan-Slavism. At the same time, Russia introduced the term “the sick man of the Bosphorus,” a synonym for the sultan and the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was in decline, but it was not sick at all, and the British never accepted this expression.
In his speech at the launch of your study, Noel Malcolm said that “The Albanian Question in British Diplomacy, 1877–1880” addresses a subject that other authors have also written about, but no one before had dealt with the Albanian question of this period as you have here. Malcolm also noted that you have, with tireless scholarly rigor, examined in fine detail the events of that period that were important for the Albanian people and for the history of the region and Europe. He also added that, thanks to the contents of the book we are discussing, the situation on the ground and the way it was characterized by British diplomats are revealed through the reports they sent to their government in London. A special tribute from a distinguished historian to your work.
Noel Malcolm is one of the world’s foremost and best-known historians and intellectuals. In the Balkans he is known for his book on the history of Bosnia and his book on Kosovo, the two best works written about these two peoples. But in Great Britain and worldwide, Noel Malcolm is better known as one of the leading scholars of Thomas Hobbes. As a senior research fellow at Oxford, he has also written a range of other works, including “Agents of Empire,” another well-known work about two Albanian families from Ulcinj. A few months ago, he also published a book called “Useful Enemies.” This book, which examines the reasons and causes for the division between East and West, has been highly praised by readers and critics, like all his other books. Above all, Noel Malcolm is a friend of the Albanians and chair of the Anglo-Albanian Association, based in London, which was founded by Aubrey Herbert during the First World War. Malcolm spoke about my book at its launch at the Embassy of the Republic of Albania in London, and this is a great honor for me.
What do the British say, especially about events in the Vilayet of Kosovo and the border with Serbia in 1877, on the eve of the organization of the Albanian League of Prizren, and which events related to the Vilayet of Kosovo, especially on the border with Serbia in 1878, can you single out?
Although peace negotiations between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire had concluded in early March 1877, by August of that year Belgrade was openly preparing for new attacks. Consul White reported a major mobilization of Serbian forces preparing to be sent south, specifically toward Kosovo. This mobilization was in fact intended to occupy new territories and expel Albanians from the lands that had come under Serbian rule. With this move, the Serbs aimed to further destabilize the Albanian territories within the Ottoman border. Belgrade also gave signs that it would attack in the direction of Bosnia, which alarmed European diplomats in Belgrade, since Vienna, which had declared Bosnia to be within its sphere of interest, would not tolerate such a thing. The British warned the Serbian government about these plans. The Serbian attack toward Bosnia did not take place, but what diplomats noted in Belgrade was that the Serbs, led by Prince Milan, had begun turning their backs on Vienna and orienting themselves toward Russia. The growth of Russian influence was evident throughout Serbia. This new direction was a danger to the Balkans and dashed the hopes of Serbian liberals for a return toward Europe.
One figure often discussed in our historiography is Ali Pasha of Gusinje, who was killed by fighters of the League in Gjakova. Why did this Ottoman pasha make such an effort to persuade the Albanians to implement the decisions of the Congress of Berlin?
Mehmet Ali Pasha and Karatheodori Pasha were plenipotentiary representatives of the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Berlin. The first was a German convert to Islam and, because of his origins, Albanians called him Ali Pasha Maxharri. The second was Greek and had built a successful career, since he was the son of the sultan’s personal physician. This is not particularly surprising, since most officials in the service of Ottoman diplomacy or foreign policy were Christians.
In any case, both pashas tried to represent the Sublime Porte with dignity in Berlin, endeavoring to preserve as much territory as possible. Ali Pasha’s activities in this regard prompted the German chancellor, Prince Bismarck, to tell the pasha that he had come to Berlin to hear and accept decisions, not to lay down conditions, since he represented the losing side. Bismarck even went so far as to mock Ali Pasha to belittle him. He called him “der Magderburger,” after the place in Germany where he had been born.
When the issue of Bar was discussed, Karatheodori Pasha strongly opposed the city’s transfer to Montenegro. He stressed that the city was inhabited by Albanians and that it was being unjustly separated from one ethnic community and transferred to another with which it had no connection. Karatheodori’s objection was not taken into account when the decisions were made. But what matters is that, by opposing the decision, Karatheodori Pasha had brought the Albanian national question up for discussion, only for it to be denied as well.
Ali Pasha Maxharri was sent to Kosovo by the sultan to persuade the Albanians not to resist the decisions of the Congress of Berlin and to hand Plav and Gusinje over to Montenegro. On August 19, Ali Pasha Maxharri met the British ambassador in Istanbul, Henry Layard, and told him that he was going to Kosovo on the sultan’s orders. The pasha arrived in Prizren on August 24 and asked the leaders of the League of Prizren to accept the terms of Berlin. His proposal was categorically rejected, and the pasha decided to continue on to Plav and Gusinje. In early September he stopped in Gjakova, where he was killed by members of the League. The pasha, failing to take into account how much the situation had changed, misjudged the position created by the Albanians and thus became the first victim of the decisions of the Congress of Berlin. His killing changed the situation even further. After this event, the Great Powers practically no longer knew what to do, while the Albanians’ desire for independence from the Sublime Porte grew.
How was the border between Kosovo and Serbia determined in this period, after the Congress of Berlin, and why was Përpellac, an Albanian locality right on the border with Serbia even today, one of the most sensitive points in setting the border between the Ottoman Empire and Serbia? Why did this happen?
The Serbian border with Kosovo, like those with Montenegro and Greece, proved more problematic than had been thought in Berlin. British diplomats knew that the Serbs had set aside large sums of money to bribe members of the boundary commission dealing with Kosovo and Bulgaria. Përpellac proved to be a major difficulty in the final determination of the border with Kosovo. This place was strategic, since a large part of Kosovo could be controlled from there. It therefore became a subject of discussion in the foreign ministries of European states. The interpretation of the treaty stated that the border was to be set according to the watershed, but Serbia opposed this because the larger and more strategic portion would remain with Kosovo. Serbia’s opposition compelled Lieutenant Blandensburg to visit the region, where he became convinced that the inhabitants were also Albanian. The British consul in Belgrade was forced to enumerate for Prince Milan all the harsh measures the Serbian government had taken to expel Albanians from their lands, without allowing them to take anything with them. In the end, Serbia, which had rejected the Austro-Hungarian maps drawn up in Berlin, withdrew from Përpellac, and the northern border of Kosovo with Serbia set at that time still exists today.
How did Lieutenant Blandensburg report on the Albanian League of Prizren, and what do those reports say?
The British government received information from the ground through its regular consular and diplomatic missions. At times it sent temporary diplomats. During crises or conflicts, it sent military officers with specific duties who prepared reports for the government in London. London sent officers to the vilayets of Shkodra and Kosovo several times for this purpose. One of them was Lieutenant Blandensburg. He made several reports for the Foreign Office, but the best known is the one on conditions in Kosovo in 1879. His report describes the dire situation in Kosovo, since the region was full of refugees from Serbia who lacked even the most basic necessities. This had radicalized the political situation, but the League of Prizren, with its effective organization, managed to deal successfully with this problem and other difficult situations.
Reports of this kind were often sent to London. They provided information that was important to the decision-making process. But today these reports also serve as important material for enriching our history.
What were Serbia’s diplomatic activities and military-police measures to expand its territories and expel Albanians from their ethnic lands at this time, and how were Albanians expelled from Niš?
British documents indicate that until 1878, Niš was an important city for Albanians, Turks, Serbs, Bulgarians, and Jews. The most beautiful part of the city was the Albanian quarter (Arnavut Mahallesi), which had 300 houses. The city as a whole had around 1,500 Albanian inhabitants. After 1878, only Serbs remained in the city, since everyone else had been forcibly expelled. Albanians were especially targeted by the violence because the city’s economy and politics had been in their hands. The most beautiful houses belonged to Albanians, and Serbian officers and other officials moved into them. From a report sent by the Ottoman consul, Nikolaides, from Niš to the British consul in Belgrade, it becomes clear that the value of the property Albanians left behind amounted to 2 million piastres. Under British pressure, the Serbian government undertook to compensate the Albanians. But the Serbs never fulfilled this obligation. Consul Nikolaides also compiled a list of several hundred other villages in southern Serbia from which Albanians had been expelled. The Serbian government also pledged, with regard to these villages, to ensure the return of those who had been expelled and compensation for Albanians who did not wish to return. This promise was not fulfilled either. Within a short period, almost the entire city was demolished, on the pretext that a new urban plan was being implemented.
According to the British, what was the Ottoman government’s relationship with the League of Prizren?
British consuls’ reports on the League of Prizren from the field were conflicting. The permanent consul Green in Shkodra and the temporary consul in Prizren, St. John, did not support the Albanian cause. Green had fallen under the influence of the Austro-Hungarian consul, Lipitch, who was of Slavic origin, while St. John acted under the influence of the Russian consul. Both called the League’s leaders tribal chiefs. Their purpose was to portray Albanians as disorganized people supposedly lacking national consciousness. To them, the League of Prizren was a fanatical (Muslim) religious organization founded by the sultan (Abdul Hamid) to oppose the decisions of the Congress of Berlin and persecute Christians. Most of these two consuls’ reports on the League are dark and misleading. St. John repeatedly wrote that the League of Prizren would massacre Christians, but found no example to illustrate his malicious prediction about the Albanians. On several occasions, Consul Green in Shkodra advised British journalists not to go to Prizren because their lives would be in danger. The reality was different, and during the League’s time, when it operated like an experienced government, the Albanian vilayets functioned better than under Ottoman rule.
British diplomats in Istanbul, who outranked St. John and Green, described this situation well. Ambassador Layard and, later, Fitzmaurice, both well-known diplomats with extensive knowledge of the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire, together with several other diplomats, wrote to the Foreign Office several times, urging it to disregard the reports these two consuls sent from Shkodra and Prizren because they did not present the situation as it was. For this reason, Fitzmaurice prepared a special report. It described the League of Prizren as a nationalist organization making demands similar to those of other Balkan nations. The diplomats in Istanbul viewed the League of Prizren favorably and considered its demands justified. Indeed, these diplomats made a request to London that the Albanians be accommodated in an autonomous state under the Sublime Porte, which would serve as the nucleus of an independent Albanian state.
When did the British diplomatic and political position toward Ottoman territories in the Balkans begin to change?
While the Conservatives led by Disraeli were in power, London recognized the League of Prizren as an organization representing Albanian demands. On May 12, 1879, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, officially received the League of Prizren’s two delegates, Abdyl Frashëri and Mehmet Vrioni, at the Foreign Office. Salisbury even advised Frashëri and Vrioni on what the League should do in the future. This was an action the opposition, that is, the Liberals, sharply criticized. They thought the British government should have treated the League’s representatives the same way the German chancellor, Bismarck, did, by refusing to meet them.
However, things changed in 1880 when the Liberals led by William Gladstone (1809–1898) came to power. His liberal doctrine gave the Russians the right and opportunity to interfere in the Balkans and other Ottoman territories where Christians lived. Gladstone was religious and favored Christians. His rise to power signaled the stifling of an atmosphere favorable to the Albanians that had been established in Britain by Lord Byron and continued by Disraeli, Urquhart, and several other figures. Gladstone established a foreign policy from which Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece would later benefit.
With Gladstone’s rise to power, the Albanians—and even more so the Sublime Porte—had reason to be afraid. Their fear increased when Ambassador Layard, who was known for his positive attitude toward the Albanian cause and the Ottoman government and was hated by the Liberals, was replaced by Joachim Goschen. Lord Fitzmaurice was sent to Istanbul to oversee the reforms. But there was a surprise. Goschen and Fitzmaurice became even more committed to the Albanian cause. These two leaders of British diplomacy in Istanbul formed the view that an Albanian state should be established. Nevertheless, in London, Prime Minister Gladstone had a different opinion. After all, Gladstone faced no pressure from public opinion to act on the proposals of the diplomats he had sent to Istanbul. For this reason, the initiative to establish the nucleus of an Albanian state gradually faded.
Let us return once more to the events of 1877 in the Vilayet of Shkodra and the determination of the border with Montenegro. What were Montenegro’s military and diplomatic activities, and what was the Albanians’ resistance to defend their territory during this period?
Ottoman military forces offered no worthy resistance to Montenegrin attacks. Ottoman territory, which was in fact inhabited by Albanians, easily fell into the hands of Serbian and Montenegrin armies. This worried the Albanians. It was why they began to organize themselves, since the Sublime Porte was not defending Albanian lands. The League of Prizren was also formed as a result of the fear created by the Porte’s failure. The League’s organization was excellent. The League, which abolished Ottoman rule, acted as a genuine government. Its organization was evident in the military sphere. When the Albanians took charge of defending the border, things changed. A powerful Albanian army was formed, since all the Albanian soldiers, especially the officers, deserted the Ottoman units and joined the League’s forces. This army, commanded by Ali Pasha of Gusinje, halted the border demarcation process and the transfer of Albanian territories to Montenegro. Within a short time, the League’s forces became a serious threat to Montenegro. The Montenegrin army tried several times to enter Plav and Gusinje, but suffered a crushing defeat. Reports sent by British consuls to London indicated that Prince Nicholas was seriously afraid that these Albanian forces might even occupy Montenegro. The Montenegrin prince’s fear was justified. But it seems the Albanian forces did not realize how powerful they were. It was a mistake to defend only the territories that Berlin had ordered to be handed over to Montenegro. The Albanian forces should have attacked and advanced as far as Cetinje, since this was possible and would have changed the future of these two countries.
How was the situation at this time reflected in the Ottoman central government, and how did it affect the Albanian question?
From July 1878 onward, Ottoman rule in the vilayets of Kosovo and Shkodra effectively no longer existed, because governance had fallen into the hands of the League of Prizren. This was a situation that suited the Sublime Porte, since the central government favored preserving Ottoman territory, of which the Albanian vilayets were a part. But this position of the Ottoman government changed when the League grew so strong that the situation was moving toward the creation of an Albanian state, which meant the reduction of Ottoman territory and the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire’s presence in Europe. The situation then changed even further when the decisions of the Congress of Berlin were not, in fact, implemented, and the Great Powers were forced to meet once again at the Berlin Conference two years later, in 1880. Without compromise, Gladstone began pressuring the sultan to hand over the territories. This was the moment when the League’s forces and those of the Porte were forced to clash militarily on many occasions. The sultan was forced to suppress the League of Prizren, taking drastic measures.
What consequences did the decisions of the Congress of San Stefano and the ambitions of certain powers to exert influence in Albania have for the Albanians, and what consequences did the fall of Bar and Ulcinj have for the organization of the Albanian political factor and the diplomatic measures taken by the Great Powers on this occasion?
The Congress of San Stefano created a Greater Bulgaria that was an extension of Russia. The territory of this Bulgaria extended deep into the lands of present-day Albania and Kosovo. In other words, the formation of such a Bulgaria ran counter to the idea of the existence of a future Albanian state. San Stefano represented an expansionist Pan-Slavic drive sponsored by Russia. This was something that the British, as well as the other European powers, could not accept. The Congress of Berlin was therefore organized, and up to that point the British position, along with that of several other powers, coincided with the Albanians’ position. The fall of Bar, Ulcinj, and other Albanian-populated territories radicalized the Albanians. It was the moment when Albanian leaders began seeking a way out of the Ottoman Empire, which was seen as no longer capable of offering protection to the territories the Albanians considered their own.
What proposals were there for territorial exchanges when it came to Ulcinj?
The Porte put forward several proposals for an exchange for Ulcinj, but two were more important. The first concerned a territory in the Sanjak east of the border with Montenegro. The second concerned a territory in Herzegovina. The British supported both proposals, but the Austro-Hungarians opposed them. Vienna did not want to reduce its territory in Herzegovina, nor did it intend to narrow the strip of the Sanjak that separated Serbia from Montenegro. It was therefore proposed that the territory transferred to Montenegro would be Ulcinj.
One of the truly impressive parts of your study concerns the Albanians’ resistance to the handover of Ulcinj to the Montenegrins.
From 1878 to 1881, the Albanians organized themselves as never before. When the Ottoman army withdrew from the territories that were to be handed over to Montenegro, the Albanian forces hurried to occupy the abandoned Ottoman positions before the Montenegrins arrived. Eventually, Consul Green was forced to acknowledge the organizational power of the League of Prizren’s branch in Shkodra. Thousands of armed Albanians headed for the border. Lake Shkodra was full of boats transporting fighters to the front. The bakeries in Shkodra produced 8,000 okas of bread every day to be sent to the border. A long line of women and children had formed to carry food and ammunition. Forces from Mirdita also arrived, which surprised and frightened the consuls in Shkodra. The city orchestra accompanied the fighters heading to the border with musical performances. Businesses in Shkodra and its surrounding area began operating in support of the war effort. The consuls began writing reports expressing amazement at the Albanians’ organization and their determination to defend their lands.
There were also many events at this time in the Vilayets of Ioannina and Monastir, and there were Greek efforts to provoke unrest in southern Albania to strengthen their position, were there not?
The Greek government never stopped obstructing the Albanian cause in the vilayets of Ioannina and Monastir. It did so by mobilizing the army to threaten the borders, deploying its diplomacy around the world, and using the Orthodox Church on the ground. In this way, Athens sought to convince the world that all Orthodox Christians were Greeks. The Greek government also tried to destabilize the part of Albania where there were no Orthodox Christians. Athens paid quite a few Albanian Catholic and Muslim agents who, openly or secretly, served the Greek cause to the detriment of the Albanian one.
In your work and studies, you have described the British opposition to the French position, which presented itself as a defender of Greek interests in relation to Albania. What was the British position, and that of the other powers, on the Albanian question and Greece’s border at the time we are discussing, and what was Protocol XIII of the Treaty of Berlin, and why did the British insist on its implementation?
Protocol XIII of the Treaty of Berlin stipulated that the Ottoman and Greek governments were to reach a bilateral agreement on the new border of the Greek state. If the two parties could not reach agreement, they were to seek the assistance of the Great Powers. No agreement had been reached by early 1880. The Greeks demanded a large territory extending northward into Albanian lands. The Ottomans rejected this expansion and offered less territory. The French fully supported the Greek demand. The Greeks also sought British support. For this reason, in early January of that year, the Greek ambassador in London met with the British Foreign Secretary. But the British did not support the Greek proposal because they considered it unfounded and unreasonable. The Greek ambassador spoke bitterly to the British secretary. The British secretary told the Greek diplomat that the delay in setting the border was due to Athens’s claims, which were making the situation more difficult. The Foreign Secretary even made it clear to the French prime minister, Waddington, that he should abandon his support for the Greek demand, because this position could provoke, in response, an increase in Albanian aspirations for independence. The Porte and the Great Powers were not prepared to address the question of Albanian independence. The Berlin Conference therefore allowed a “moderate” expansion of Greece, and France, because of Britain, abandoned its defense of the unreasonable Greek demand.
What efforts did the British and other powers make to persuade the Porte and the Albanians to implement the decisions of the Congress of Berlin?
As soon as Gladstone came to power, he signaled to the Porte that he would not tolerate delays in the process of handing over territories, especially after the Congress of Berlin. Under his influence, all the Great Powers agreed on this issue and mobilized a large naval fleet, which they concentrated in Dubrovnik. From there, they threatened the sultan and the League of Prizren to hand over the territories, namely Ulcinj and its surroundings. The threat of sending the fleet to the coast of Ulcinj produced no result. The sultan argued that conflict between his forces and those of the League risked the empire’s destruction. The Albanians had sworn to defend Ulcinj at any cost. Gladstone went a step further. He threatened the sultan that if he did not hand over the territories, his fleet would sail farther and occupy the port of Izmir, and the Ottoman customs revenues would be used as payment for the delay in handing over the territories. This was a serious violation of Ottoman sovereignty that humiliated the sultan. The other powers did not support Gladstone’s proposal. Gladstone sent word to the sultan that he would do this with the British fleet alone. In fact, this was a “bluff,” but it appeared real. A conflict between the British and the Ottomans posed a major danger to the Great Powers. Bismarck did not even agree with this, writing that “Gladstone is behaving like a mad professor.” Nevertheless, the sultan believed Gladstone’s threat and gave in. This meant that the Porte now had to send large forces to compel the Albanians to abandon their lands, including Ulcinj. This happened, and after several military clashes, Ottoman forces occupied Ulcinj and handed it over to the Montenegrins according to the agreement. The sultan then ordered the army to subdue the League’s forces, with the support of the Great Powers. By 1881, the League of Prizren had been dissolved, and Albanian political, military, and economic organization in the four vilayets had come to an end. But the Albanians’ desire for autonomy, and eventually independence, did not die.
















